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INTRODUCTION

Hematopoietic stem cell (HSC) transplantation is used
clinically to treat and cure a variety of cancers as well as blood
and immune disorders. 1 However, every year thousands of
individuals in the United States are unable to take advantage
of these treatments due to the unavailability of matched
donors.2 Even with more than twenty-four million HSC donors
1. Jos Domen et al., Bone Marrow (Hematopoietic) Stem Cells, in
REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 24 (2006), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov
/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/Regenerative_Medicine_2006.pdf
(describing HSCs and their characteristics, sources, and clinical uses).
2. Of the 20,000 patients each year with life-threatening illnesses
requiring a bone marrow transplant, approximately 14,000 need unrelated
donors to donate healthy bone marrow. See The Need for More Marrow
Donors, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://bloodcell.transplant
.hrsa.gov/donor/need_for_donors/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Need for More Donors]; see also Detailed Description of Donor
Registry
Data,
HEALTH
RESOURCES
&
SERVS.
ADMIN.,
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and cord blood units available worldwide, finding a matched
donor is difficult when the recipient is a member of an ethnic or
racial minority and especially so where the recipient is of mixed
race. 3 Given the inability of the current system of HSC
donation to meet demand, there is a need to increase the
number and diversity of available HSC donors, as well as to
motivate existing registered donors to donate when called
upon.4
The HSC transplantation industry relies on, and
mandates, donor altruism. 5 The National Organ Transplant
Act (NOTA) prohibits the exchange of valuable consideration
for HSCs collected from bone marrow to be used for
transplant.6 At present, NOTA does not prohibit compensating
donors for HSCs obtained from umbilical cord blood or
peripheral (circulating) blood; however, the Health Resources
and Services Administration (HRSA) has proposed expanding

http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/research/transplant_data/registry_tx_data
/longdesc/index.html#Fig1 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Donor
Registry Data] (showing that in 2012, the national registry facilitated 5833
unrelated HSC transplants).
3. Bone Marrow Donors Worldwide, BMDW, www.bmdw.org (last visited
Nov. 1, 2014) (“The current number of donors and cord blood units in the
BMDW database is 24,835,479.”). The patient’s race and ethnicity affect the
likelihood of finding an adult bone marrow donor match on the registry. See
Need for More Donors, supra note 2. The likelihood of not finding a match by
race is: 24% for African American or Black; 16% for Asian or Pacific Islander;
10% for American Indian or Alaska Native; 17% for Hispanic or Latino; and
3% for white. Why Race and Ethnicity Matter, BE THE MATCH,
http://bethematch.org/Transplant-Basics/Matching-patients-with-donors/Why
-race-and-ethnicity-matter/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
4. Not only does the number of registered available donors need to
increase, the acceptance rate of those registered once they are called upon
must increase as well. See R.N. Lown & B.E. Shaw, Beating the Odds: Factors
Implicated in the Speed and Availability of Unrelated Haematopoietic Cell
Donor Provision, 48 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 210, 213 (2013)
(“46.9% of U.S. donors were deferred at ‘activation’ for requests in the first
half of 2011.”); Kim Carollo, Woman Dies After Bone Marrow Transplant
Donors Back Out, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/woman-dies-leuk
emia-bone-marrow-donors-back/story?id=12120620&singlePage=true
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2014) (stating that 47% of people on donor registries say no
when they are asked to donate).
5. See infra Part III.C and accompanying notes (discussing the role of
altruism in HSC donation).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012); see infra Part II.B (reviewing state laws
affecting the sale of HSCs).
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the NOTA prohibition to cover all HSCs. 7 In any event, the
reliance on altruism is currently so ingrained in HSC
transplantation that bureaucratic barriers prevent donors from
receiving compensation in situations where it would be legally
permissible.8
Donors are the only parties in the HSC transplant chain
who are not compensated for their involvement. 9 HSCs are
routinely treated as commodities being bought and sold in a
hidden economy that crosses international borders. 10 This
shadow industry is underpinned by mandated donor altruism,
and is also reliant on such altruism for its very existence.11
However, it is advantageous for all parties involved to
encourage HSC donation. Not only would the compensation of
donors increase the number and retention of donors, but it will
also serve as an acknowledgement of the important
contribution that donors make. 12 This Article will focus on
7. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ” Under Section 301 of
the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,810, 60,811–12
(proposed Oct. 2, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121) [hereinafter
Change to the Definition of “Human Organ”].
8. Due to stringent tissue compatibility requirements for HSC donations,
unrelated donors and recipients rely on national and international HSC
registries to be matched. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. In the
United States, the only registry option is the Be the Match Registry, which
refuses to work with compensated donors, regardless of the type of HSCs they
donate. See Coalition Says PBSC Donor Compensation Poses Health Risks to
Patients and Donors, BE THE MATCH, http://bethematch.org/templates
/displaynewsrelease?id=707 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (describing the
position of Jeffrey W. Chell, M.D., Chief Executive Officer of the National
Marrow Donor Program, a coalition member that operates the Be the Match
Registry, who said, “[t]hose motivated by self-gain are more likely to withhold
health information that would make them unsafe donors. The blood banking
experience in the United States shows that this results in donations that are
unacceptable from a clinical standpoint”).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Parts III.A–B.
11. See infra Parts III.A–B.
12. Individuals who were offered economic rewards to donate blood, and
were aware of the rewards prior to donating, were more likely to donate, and
the likelihood of donation increased with the higher the value of the rewards;
they were also more likely to attract others to donate. See Nicola Lacetera et
al., Rewarding Altruism? A Natural Field Experiment 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
17636,
2011),
available
at
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/may2012-paris-lacetera-macis
-slonim.pdf; see also Theodore C. Bergstrom et al., One Change in a Million:
Altruism and the Bone Marrow Registry, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1309, 1327 (2009)
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increasing HSC donations by repealing laws prohibiting
compensation for HSC donation and permitting limited and
regulated compensation for donors.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. HSCS AND HSC TRANSPLANTS
1. Hematopoietic (Blood Forming) Stem Cells
Blood cells are essential to a variety of processes in the
human body and need to be constantly replenished by HSCs,
which give rise to all blood cell types.13 When large portions of
an individual’s HSCs are destroyed, death results from the
inability of the body to produce new blood cells. 14 HSC
transplantation is used to treat patients with damaged or
defective HSCs; the transplanted HSCs replenish the blood cell
production in the recipient.15
HSC transplantation either uses the patient’s own cells
(autologous transplant) or the cells of a donor (allogeneic
transplant).16 In order for the dysfunctional or destroyed blood
production capacity to be fully restored by transplanted HSCs,
the HSCs must engraft in the recipient’s body and permanently
reestablish blood production. 17 After an HSC transplant, the
(arguing that monetary compensation for HSCs would increase both the
incentive to join a bone marrow registry and the incentive to donate if asked);
David E. Harrington & Edward A. Sayre, Paying for Bodies, but Not for
Organs, REGULATION, Winter 2006–2007, at 14, 14 (noting that significantly
more whole body donations are made to medical schools—which take care of
cremation—in states with high funeral costs, indicating that financial
considerations are an important component in the decision to donate).
13. HSCs are the sole source of the one hundred billion new blood cells
humans require each day. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF
THE CELL 1283 (4th ed. 2002); Domen et al., supra note 1, at 14.
14. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1288.
15. Domen et al., supra note 1, at 24.
16. Id. at 25; Mary M. Horowitz, Uses and Growth of Hematopoietic Cell
Transplantation, in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION 15,
17–18 (Frederick R. Appelbaum et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009). Autologous
transplantation is common where a patient’s own HSCs are healthy, but are
expected to be destroyed by high dose chemotherapy or radiation cancer
treatment, and can be collected and stored prior to such treatment. See James
O. Armitage, The History of Autologous Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation,
in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra, at 8, 8.
17. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1288.
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blood produced by the recipient will be genetically identical to
the donor and not the recipient.18
2. The Role of Histocompatibility in HSC Transplants
The success of an allogeneic HSC transplant 19 largely
depends on finding an immunologically compatible donor. 20
Histocompatibility locus antigen (HLA) genes and proteins are
key to compatibility as they are involved in the body’s immune
response, working with T-cells to respond to and combat
foreign materials.21
HLA proteins are present in all cells, wherein they bind to
foreign proteins; potential sources of which include viruses,
microbes, and parasites. 22 Once an HLA protein binds to a
foreign protein within the cell, the complex is moved to the
outside of the cell to signal that the cell is potentially infected.23
T-cells are selective and only recognize foreign proteins bound
to HLA proteins on the outside of a cell. 24 When a T-cell
recognizes a foreign protein, it marks the cell for destruction.25

18. Paul J. Martin, Documentation of Engraftment and Characterization
of Chimerism Following Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation, in THOMAS’
HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 365, 365–69
(explaining that during the first few weeks after a transplant, both donor and
recipient cells can be found in the blood, and the portion of recipient cells
decreases over time).
19. Hereinafter all references to HSC transplants are to allogeneic HSC
transplants.
20. See Cladio Anasetti et al., Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation from
Human Leukocyte Antigen Partially Matched Related Donors, in THOMAS’
HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 657, 671
(“Transplant results have demonstrated that an increasing degree of donor
HLA incompatibility is associated with a proportionally increased risk of graft
failure, GVHD, and transplant-related mortality.”).
21. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1409; see also Anasetti et al., supra
note 20 (discussing HSC transplants in partially matched HLA donors).
22. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1397.
23. Id.
24. Id.; Domen et al., supra note 1, at 19. The selective nature of T-cells is
due to the complex process in which they are generated, wherein T-cells that
recognize the “self” are destroyed, and non-self-recognizing T-cells are
exported throughout the body where they may replicate. See Paul J. Martin,
Overview of Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation Immunology, in THOMAS’
HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 131, 134.
25. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1392–93.
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There are two immunological mechanisms through which
an HSC transplant may fail: graft failure and graft versus host
disease (GVHD). 26 Graft failure occurs where the recipient’s
immune system recognizes the HLA proteins on the
transplanted cells as foreign and targets them for destruction.27
Because T-cells gain their selectivity for foreign material
during the development process, T-cells that develop from
donor HSCs within a recipient will recognize the recipient as
self, but may not recognize other donor HSCs or blood cells
originating from donor cells as self. 28 Graft failure can be
preemptively mitigated by matching the donor and recipient’s
HLA, by depleting the recipient’s immune system prior to
transplant, and by continuing to suppress the immune system
afterwards using immunosuppressive medication.29
GVHD is unique to HSC transplants and occurs as the
result of transplanted donor T-cells (developed in the donor)
recognizing the recipient’s cells as foreign and marking all the
recipients cells for destruction. 30 Depleting the recipient’s
immune system prior to transplant exacerbates any GVHD
because the depletion primes the recipient’s immune system for
a response so that when introduced, the transplanted donor Tcells become activated and divide. 31 GVHD cannot be
successfully treated with immunosuppressant medication, but
the risk of GVHD can be reduced by stringently selecting
donors with HLA compatibility.32

26. Martin, supra note 24, at 131.
27. Graft failure is similar to the type of organ rejection that occurs after
a solid organ transplant. See id.
28. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1367 (explaining how T-cells
develop in the thymus from HSCs that migrate there through the blood). Tcells produced by the recipient may recognize the HLA proteins themselves as
foreign, regardless of whether they are bound to foreign proteins. See id.
29. Domen et al., supra note 1, at 15, 24–27; Martin, supra note 24, at
131, 138.
30. Martin, supra note 24, at 131 (stating that GVHD does not occur in
solid organ transplantation due to the limited number of transplanted T-cells
or other cells with immunologic function).
31. James L. M. Ferrara & Joseph H. Antin, The Pathophysiology of
HEMATOPOIETIC
CELL
Graft-Versus-Host
Disease,
in
THOMAS’
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 208, 208; Martin, supra note 24, at 138.
32. Anasetti et al., supra note 20 (stating post-transplant
immunosuppression does not control GVHD from highly mismatched donors);
Mark F. Anderson, Encouraging Bone Marrow Transplants from Unrelated
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Five forms of HLA proteins are commonly used to match
donors and recipients.33 Separate genes encode each of the five
forms, of which every person has two sets—one from each
parent. 34 For any one patient there is a twenty-five percent
probability that any one of her siblings inherited identical HLA
forms (a 10/10 match). 35 The probability that a patient will
have a match depends on their number of siblings;36 based on
the average size of families in the United States, there is a
twenty to thirty percent chance that patients will have an
HLA-matching sibling. 37 The remaining seventy to eighty
percent of patients have to rely on a donor registry to be
matched to an unrelated donor. 38 Much of the difficulty in
finding an unrelated donor stems from the fact that each of the

Donors: Some Proposed Solutions to a Pressing Social Problem, 54 U. PITT. L.
REV. 477, 483 (1993). Although donor immune cells may cause GVHD, they
may also be helpful in destroying the recipient’s cancerous cells through the
graft versus tumor response. See Domen et al., supra note 1, at 25.
33. In the United Kingdom, a 10/10 match of the two sets of HLA-A, HLAB, HLA-C, HLA-DRB1, and HLA-DQB1 is considered optimal, although a 9/10
may be accepted. See Lown & Shaw, supra note 4, at 210, 213–15. While more
than five HLA forms exist, only five are commonly used for matching at
present. See RICHARD T. MAZIARZ, BLOOD AND MARROW TRANSPLANT
HANDBOOK 4 (Richard T. Maziarz & Susan Slater eds., 2011).
34. Martin, supra note 24, at 131.
35. Id. at 131–32 (“For a given patient there is a 0.25 probability that any
one sibling inherited the same paternal haplotype and the same maternal
haplotype, thereby being HLA-genotypically identical.”).
36. James O. Armitage, Bone Marrow Transplantation, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 827, 827 (1994) (“The formula for calculating the chance that a
particular person has an HLA matched sibling is 1 – (0.75)ⁿ, where n denotes
the number of potential sibling donors.”).
37. See Karen K. Ballen et al., Umbilical Cord Blood Transplantation:
The First 25 Years and Beyond, 122 BLOOD 491, 492 (2013) (“[O]nly 30% of
patients who require an allograft will have a human leukocyte antigen (HLA)matched sibling donor.”); Effie W. Petersdorf, The World Marrow Donor
Association: Twenty Years of International Collaboration for the Support of
Unrelated Donor and Cord Blood Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation, 45
BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 807, 807 (2010) (“[I]t is now estimated that
only 20% of patients in the United States in need of a transplant have a
genotypically HLA-identical sibling to serve as a donor, largely as a result of
the smaller average family size . . . .”); M. Oudshoorn et al., Hematopoietic
Stem Cell Donor Selection: The Eurodonor Experience, 67 HUMAN
IMMUNOLOGY 405, 405 (2006) (“[T]he availability of an HLA-matched sibling
donor for patients in need of an allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell transplant
is only about 30%.”).
38. Petersdorf, supra note 37, at 807.
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genes coding for HLA have numerous forms and vary widely in
the general population, with some genes having more than 700
forms without any one predominating.39
Even though there are over twenty-four million donors and
cord blood units available worldwide, many individuals are
unable to find a matching donor.40 Additionally, the likelihood
of finding a match varies widely depending on the recipient’s
race and ethnicity, with probabilities ranging from sixty-six
percent for African American patients to ninety-three percent
for white patients. 41 Even though these percentages have
improved greatly over the years as the number of HLA-typed
donors in worldwide databases has increased, every year
thousands of individuals in the United States alone are unable
to find matches.42
3. Sources of HSCs for Transplant
There are three sources of HSCs for transplant: bone
marrow, peripheral blood, and umbilical cord blood. 43 Bone
marrow is aspirated from a donor under anesthesia by applying
suction to a needle inserted into the marrow of the posterior
39. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1398 (explaining that some HLA
genes have more than 200 forms without any one predominating); Martin,
supra note 24, at 131 (noting that as of 2007 there were 729 known forms of
HLA-B). There is a selective advantage for different HLA proteins in order to
recognize a wide array of threats, and certain forms will be selected for in
communities in response to specific threats, parasites, and viruses. See
ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 13, at 1409.
40. J.J. van Rood & M. Oudshoorn, Eleven Million Donors in Bone
Marrow Donors Worldwide! Time for Reassessment?, 41 BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION 1, 2 (2008) (“[I]n the period 2000–2006, out of about
151,000 patients qualifying for an HLA unrelated donor (UD) transplant, only
64,720 received one.”); Bone Marrow Donors Worldwide, supra note 3.
41. Why Race and Ethnicity Matter, supra note 3.
42. General Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS.
ADMIN., http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/general_faqs/index.html#10
80%20How%20many%20people%20need (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). Over a
decade ago when there were only 7.5 million donors on the list, the probability
of finding a matched donor was significantly lower than today. See C.K.
Hurley et al., Maximizing Optimal Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donor Selection
from Registries of Unrelated Adult Volunteers, 61 TISSUE ANTIGENS 415, 415,
419 (2003).
43. Phyllis I. Warkentin & Elizabeth J. Shpall, Hematopoietic Cell
Procurement, Processing, and Transplantation: Standards, Accreditation, and
Regulation, in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note
16, at 535, 535.
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iliac crest.44 A typical collection involves 50 to 300 aspirations
and the removal of 200 to 1500mL of marrow.45
HSCs can also be filtered and collected from peripheral
blood by apheresis. 46 Under normal conditions, the
concentration of HSCs in peripheral blood is insufficient for use
in transplantation.47 Donors receive five days of injections of a
compound that stimulates HSCs to migrate from the bone
marrow into the peripheral blood in order to increase the
concentration of HSCs.48 On the fifth day of the injections, the
donor attends a blood center or apheresis unit of a hospital
where HSCs are filtered from their blood. 49 The collection
process is either performed in one apheresis session up to eight
hours in length or two apheresis sessions of four to six hours
each.50
HSCs are also present in umbilical cord blood.51 Cord blood
can be collected after birth and the HSCs concentrated, tested,
frozen, and stored (banked) for future use. 52 Cord blood is
either stored in a public bank where it is accessible to any

44. Dennis L. Confer et al., Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Cell
Donors and Donor Registries, in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 544, 548 (explaining how access to the
bone is obtained via small incisions or punctures, and a large bore needle is
inserted into the bone).
45. Id. (explaining that several aspirations may be obtained from a single
bone puncture by advancing the needle after each aspiration); Willis H.
Navarro et al., National Marrow Donor Program: Donor Issues, 19 BIOLOGY
BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION S15, S15 (2013).
46. See Confer et al., supra note 44.
47. Armitage, supra note 16, at 9.
48. Confer et al., supra note 44; Donating Peripheral Blood Stem Cells, BE
THE MATCH, http://bethematch.org/Support-the-Cause/Donate-bone-marrow
/Donation-process/Donating-PBSC/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
49. Confer et al., supra note 44 (explaining how blood is withdrawn from
the donor through one line, circulated through an apheresis machine where
the HSCs are separated and collected, and the remainder of the blood is
returned to the donor through a return line).
50. Navarro et al., supra note 45, at S15; Donating Peripheral Blood Stem
Cells, supra note 48.
51. Hal E. Broxmeyer & Franklin O. Smith, Cord Blood Hematopoietic
Cell Transplantation, in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION,
supra note 16, at 559, 559.
52. Id. at 561.
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matching recipient or a private bank for familial use.53 Prior to
being stored in a public cord blood bank, samples are HLA
typed and tested to ensure safety and a sufficient number of
cells for transplant.54
Each source has its own set of benefits and drawbacks
largely pertaining to availability, number of HSC cells
collected, likelihood of GVHD and resulting stringency of HLA
matching required, and potential risks to donors. 55 Many
patients in need of an HSC transplant benefit from expediency,
so timely access to HSCs has a significant effect on their
prognosis. 56 Cord blood units are much more accessible than
other sources of HSCs because registry information on cord
blood represents HSCs immediately available for transplant,
whereas listings for bone marrow and peripheral blood donors
merely represent potential donors. 57 Moreover, forty-seven
percent of potential donors in the United States who were
listed in the registry were unable, unavailable, or chose not to
donate when contacted about a match, causing delays and
increasing the time from the recognition of the need for a
transplant to the performance of a transplant.58
The number of cells that can be collected for transplant
depends on the source of the HSCs. Theoretically, the
regeneration of a recipient’s hematopoietic system could occur
from one cell; however, transplant success rates increase with
the number of cells and a minimum ratio of HSCs to body
weight is required for optimal results. 59 The low numbers of
53. In the absence of a family history of blood disorders there is a large
push for public and not private banking; several autologous and sibling cord
blood transplants have been reported, but they are uncommon. See Ballen et
al., supra note 37, at 492–93; Broxmeyer & Smith, supra note 51, at 559–60.
54. Broxmeyer & Smith, supra note 51, at 560–61.
55. See id. at 569; Domen et al., supra note 1, at 22; Lown & Shaw, supra
note 4; Ann E. Woolfrey, Donor Selection for Hematopoietic Cell
Transplantation, in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra
note 16, at 692, 695.
56. Effie W. Petersdorf, Stem Cell Transplantation for Hematologic
Malignancies, in HEMATOPOIETIC STEM CELL TRANSPLANTATION 19, 31
(Robert J. Soiffer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
57. See Ballen et al., supra note 37; Domen et al., supra note 1, at 22.
58. See Lown & Shaw, supra note 4; Carollo, supra note 4.
59. Ballen et al., supra note 37, at 493; Domen et al., supra note 1, at 21
(explaining that animal studies have shown regeneration of the blood forming
system from one HSC).
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HSCs present in cord blood units have largely restricted the
use of cord blood to children.60 However, transplants using two
combined cord blood units may overcome problems associated
with low numbers of cells.61
Considering the devastating impact of GVHD on
transplant success, any differences in the rates of GVHD are
very important. Transplants with HSCs obtained from cord
blood have lower incidence rates of GVHD compared to HSCs
collected by other methods.62 The lower GVHD rates have been
attributed to the absence of immunologically active cells and
the relative immaturity of immune cells that are present.63 Due
to these lower GVHD rates, the standard of HLA matching is
more permissive for cord blood, and transplants have been
successful with as little as four or five out of six HLA genes
matched.64 This less stringent matching requirement has the
potential to assist patients having difficulties finding a match
for rare HLA types, including patients of races and ethnicities
that are underrepresented in worldwide donor databases. 65
60. Woolfrey, supra note 55 (explaining that the total number of HSCs in
cord blood are ten times lower than from bone marrow); see Ballen et al.,
supra note 37, at 493; Claudio G. Brunstein et al., Allogeneic Hematopoietic
Cell Transplantation for Hematologic Malignancy: Relative Risk and Benefits
of Double Umbilical Cord Blood, 116 BLOOD 4693, 4696 (2010); Domen et al.,
supra note 1, at 22.
61. See Ballen et al., supra note 37, at 494 (explaining that double
umbilical cord blood transplants became very popular in the United States
due to the relatively high weight of the population, but results have been
mixed and some studies question the benefit of double as opposed to single
cord transplants); Brunstein et al., supra note 60, at 4693.
62. Broxmeyer & Smith, supra note 51, at 569. Studies of HSCs from bone
marrow and peripheral blood generally show similar rates of GVHD. See
Norbert Schmitz, Peripheral Blood Hematopoietic Cells for Allogeneic
Transplantation, in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra
note 16, at 618, 623.
63. See Woolfrey, supra note 55.
64. Lown & Shaw, supra note 4, at 215; see Brunstein et al., supra note
60, at 4693; Woolfrey, supra note 55 (noting that closer matching overall leads
to better survival rates, but mismatched HSCs obtained from cord blood are
not as fatal as mismatches from other HSC sources).
65. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INTERIM REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON HOW FEDERAL FUNDS ARE DISTRIBUTED TO CORD BLOOD BANKS
PARTICIPATING IN THE NATIONAL CORD BLOOD INVENTORY 3 (2011), available
at http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/legislation_and_contracts/cbcc/07
2011interimreport.pdf (“Cord Blood units serve as the source of blood stem
cells for minority patients much more frequently than adult donor products.”);
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Additionally, in an effort to further benefit patients from
minority
populations,
expectant
mothers
from
underrepresented ethnic and racial backgrounds can be
selectively encouraged to donate.66
The potential health risks faced by donors depend on the
source of HSCs. The collection of HSCs from cord blood poses
the lowest level of risk to the donor, as the only physical
intrusion is a blood test of the mother.67 The donation of HSCs
via aspiration of bone marrow or apheresis of peripheral blood
is not without risks; even though the risk of a severe event
from bone marrow donation is less than one percent, this risk is
slightly higher than the risk of donating peripheral blood. 68
Risks involved in the donation of bone marrow are primarily
associated with the need for anesthesia and the physical
intrusion; symptoms include pain, sore throat, nausea, lightheadedness and vomiting.69 The risks associated with apheresis
are primarily related to the mobilizing compound given to the
donor to cause her HSCs to migrate from the bone marrow into
the peripheral blood, but may also stem from the placement of
the blood draw line during collection. 70 Symptoms from
donation by apheresis may include pain, headache, nausea,
vomiting, bruising at vein access site, and alteration of the
id. at 3 n.7 (“Minority patients who are unable to find an adequately matched
adult marrow donor on the Registry are often able to find an adequately
matched cord blood unit for transplantation.”).
66. Id. at 2–3 (noting that the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services emphasizes increasing the number of cord blood units collected from
minority donors; the dollar amount reimbursed to cord banks differs based on
the patient’s ethnicity and race to further this goal); Lown & Shaw, supra note
4, at 214.
67. See N.Y. Blood Center, Consent Form for Clinical Investigation,
NATIONAL CORD BLOOD PROGRAM, http://www.nationalcordbloodprogram.org
/donation/consent.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (citing the risks of a blood
draw and noting that it is possible that results of the blood test may have
“negative psychological or financial effects or may affect your ability to get
health insurance”).
68. Confer et al., supra note 44, at 549 (“The frequency of serious adverse
events following marrow donation is estimated at 0.1–0.3 percent.”); Lown &
Shaw, supra note 4 (explaining that donation of HSCs via apheresis of
peripheral blood has a lower incidence of adverse events); Navarro et al.,
supra note 45, at S17 (noting that the risk of a serious adverse event
associated with apheresis of peripheral blood is lower than one percent).
69. Confer et al., supra note 44, at 548–50.
70. Id.
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donor’s blood composition.71 As apheresis only became widely
used for HSC collection in the 1990s, long-term studies are still
being conducted.72 Nearly ninety percent of all peripheral blood
and bone marrow donors experience pain; the primary
differences between the two methods are timing of the
symptoms and time to full recovery. 73 In addition to health
risks, all methods of HSC collection pose a potential risk to the
privacy of the donor’s genetic information.74
B. HISTORY OF HSC TRANSPLANTATION
Even though HSC transplantation did not achieve success
as a therapy for blood disorders until 1968, 75 the idea of
transplanting body parts and fluids has been around for
thousands of years.76 Blood transfusions attempted in the midseventeenth century were unsuccessful, and it was not until
1825 that human blood was successfully transfused into
another human.77 The discovery of different types of blood and
71. See, e.g., id. at 547 (explaining how the mobilizing agent may
precipitate a severe sickle crisis in persons with sickle cell anemia).
72. Navarro et al., supra note 45, at S18 (stating that the National Donor
Marrow Program is currently conducting a long-term donor follow-up study
specifically aimed at tracking the incidence of malignancies, including
hematologic cancers, as well as thrombosis and autoimmunity, and final
analysis of this data is expected in 2020).
73. Id. at S16, S18. Discomfort from the peripheral blood mobilizing agent
begins as early as the second day of shots and continues until collection and
symptoms decrease twenty-four to forty-eight hours after stopping
stimulation. Id. Pain from bone marrow donation does not begin until after
collection, and slowly declines over the first week, lingering up to several
weeks in some instances. Id. at S16.
74. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
75. Fulvio Porta et al., Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplantation: 40 Years
of Continuous Progress and Evolution, 93 HAEMATOLOGICA 1607, 1607 (2008).
76. See Kristy Lynn Williams et al., Just Say No to NOTA: Why the
Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should
Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver Organs Instituted, AM. J.
LAW & MED. (forthcoming) (citing NICHOLAS L. TILNEY, TRANSPLANT: FROM
MYTH TO REALITY 10 (2003); J. Englebert Dunphy, The Story of Organ
Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 67 (1969); Laurel R. Siegel, ReEngineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 919
(2000)) (explaining that over 3000 years ago, procedures using autologous skin
grafts to repair mutilated noses were devised in India and later depicted in
Egyptian papyri).
77. R. M. Boyce, Organ Transplantation Crisis: Should the Deficit Be
Eliminated Though Inter Vivos Sales?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 283, 284 (1983)

2015]

HIDDEN ECONOMY

229

blood incompatibilities in 1901, and the use of anticoagulants,
led to the widespread use of human blood transfusions in World
War I.78
Bone marrow has been known to be involved in the
generation of blood cells since the turn of the nineteenth
century, and was proposed as a treatment for diseases
resulting from defective hemogenesis. 79 Human bone marrow
was first used as a treatment in 1939, although the treatment
was not an attempt at transplantation.80
In the late 1940s and early 1950s research revealed that
bone marrow was critical in the recovery from high doses of
radiation, which would otherwise result in lethal hematopoietic
injury. 81 Post-radiation injections of bone marrow saved

(explaining that in 1667, sheep’s blood was transfused into a fifteen-year-old
boy who subsequently died); History of Blood Transfusion, 146 NATURE 228,
228 (1940).
78. Boyce, supra note 77 (citing W. R. CLARK, THE EXPERIMENTAL
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN IMMUNOLOGY 8 (1980)); History of Blood
Transfusion, supra note 77, at 229.
79. See Armitage, supra note 36 (citing Claude E. Forkner, Leukemia and
Allied Disorders, 196 AM. J. MED. SCI. 377 (1938)). The only treatments in the
1800s with bone marrow involved the ingestion of bovine marrow. William E.
Quine, Section Chairman, Am. Med. Ass’n, Chairman’s Address: The
Remedial Application of Bone Marrow (May 1896), in XXVI JAMA 1012
(1896), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/JAMA/11174
/jama_XXVI_21_001c.pdf.
80. See Armitage, supra note 36, at 827 (citing Edwin E. Osgood et al.,
Aplastic Anemia Treated with Daily Transfusions and Intravenous Marrow;
Case Report, 13 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 357 (1939)) (explaining that a patient
received eighteen milliliters of intravenous marrow from his brother as
treatment for aplastic anemia); Maurice Morrison & A. A. Samwick,
Intramedullary (Sternal) Transfusion of Human Bone Marrow, 115 JAMA
1708, 1709 (1940) (explaining that eight cubic centimeters of bone marrow
from the patient’s brother was injected into the patient’s sternal marrow).
Experiments were not attempts at transplantation as the physicians merely
hoped that an unknown factor present in the donated marrow might stimulate
the diseased marrow to function normally. Morrison & Samwick, supra; E.
Donnall Thomas, A History of Allogeneic Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation,
in THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 3, 3.
81. Thomas, supra note 80, at 3, 6 n.5. (“Jacobson and colleagues . . .
found that a mouse would survive otherwise lethal irradiation if the spleen
were exteriorized and protected from the irradiation . . . . Lorenz et al.
extended these observations by demonstrating a similar protective effect by an
infusion of bone marrow cells.”).
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irradiated rodents from lethal injury.82 It was later shown that
the protective effect was due to the ability of the HSCs present
in the transplanted bone marrow to regenerate the bloodforming system in the recipient.83
Clinical trials for bone marrow transplants, aimed at
regenerating the hematopoietic system in patients, began in
the late 1950s; these initial attempts at transplant failed.84 The
first successful transplant occurred in 1959 between identical
twins; it was demonstrated that lethal irradiation followed by
intravenous infusion of bone marrow from a healthy identical
twin had an antileukemic effect even in advanced leukemia.85
The success of the transplant between twins highlighted the
importance of marrow coming from a compatible donor.86 In the
1950s the role of histocompatibility in immunity and graft
rejection was still in its infancy, and by 1958 HLA groups were
first described and shown to be inherited.87
It was not until 1968 that the first successful allogeneic
HSC transplant occurred; however, the recipient patient had a

82. Domen et al., supra note 1, at 14–15 (citing Egon Lorenz et al.,
Modification of Acute Irradiation Injury in Mice and Guinea Pigs by Bone
Marrow Injection, 58 RADIOLOGY 863 (1951)).
83. Domen et al., supra note 1, at 15; Thomas, supra note 80 (explaining
that in 1955 it was shown the protective effect was cellular and not hormonal
in nature).
84. Thomas, supra note 80, at 5.
85. Id. at 3–4 (explaining that an identical twin with terminal leukemia
was given total body irradiation and an intravenous infusion of marrow from
his healthy twin, and that the level of radiation would have caused death, but
the patient recovered and leukemia disappeared for four months). Such a
transplantation is not considered to be an allogeneic transplantation due to
the similarities between twins; it is considered a syngeneic transplantation.
Id.
86. Id. Histocompatibility was not well understood in the 1950s; the first
long term successful kidney transplant occurred in 1954 between twins as
well. See Dunphy, supra note 76, at 69.
87. See Thomas, supra note 80, at 5; see also Boyce, supra note 77, at 285
(discussing histocompatibility factors and how medicine has overcome
rejection). HLA matching occurred by an assay where the donors’ antibodies
were introduced to cells from the recipient and cross reactivity of the two were
analyzed, and in 1964, the first international meeting was held to discuss
HLA and methods for assessing histocompatibility for the matching of donors
and recipients. Eric Mickelson & Effie W. Petersdorf, Histocompatibility, in
THOMAS’ HEMATOPOIETIC CELL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16, at 145, 150.
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severe immune deficiency and was not able to reject the graft.88
The first HSC transplant involving a recipient that was not
immune compromised occurred in 1969 between HLA-matched
siblings.89 This success sparked an increase in HLA-matched
sibling transplants, with studies published in 1975 and 1977
describing the use of HSC transplants for hundreds of patients
and reporting a number of survivors, including long-term
survivors.90
By the early 1970s, the importance of HLA matching for
transplants was known. 91 Although up until this time HSC
transplants had only been attempted between siblings, the
feasibility of using transplants from unrelated HLA matched
donors started being discussed.92 In 1970, a group of doctors in
the Netherlands proposed the creation of a Europe-wide file of
potential donors to match recipients and thereby facilitate
unrelated HSC transplants.93 In 1974, the mother of a young
patient in need of an HSC transplant established the Anthony
Nolan Bone Marrow Registry (ANBMR) in England, which was
dedicated to recruiting and maintaining a file of volunteers and
cataloging the information so that it could easily be determined
whether a potential donor’s type matched that of a patient in

88. Thomas, supra note 80, at 5 (explaining that this transplant used
bone marrow from a sibling); van Rood & Oudshoorn, supra note 40, at 1. The
first successful transplant was soon followed by two others where the
recipients were immunocompromised. Horowitz, supra note 16, at 15.
89. Thomas, supra note 80, at 5 (explaining that the recipient had chronic
myelogenous leukemia, was irradiated before the transplantation, only got
mild GVHD, and died fifty-six days after transplant).
90. Id. at 5–6 (citing E. D. Thomas et al., Bone-Marrow Transplantation,
292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 832 (1975); E. D. Thomas et al., One Hundred Patients
with Acute Leukemia Treated by Chemotherapy, Total Body Irradiation, and
Allogeneic Marrow Transplantation, 49 BLOOD 511 (1977)).
91. Thomas, supra note 80, at 5.
92. Id. By 1970, eleven forms of HLA-A had been described. Mickelson &
Petersdorf, supra note 87, at 151.
93. Brian London, Should Bone Marrow Donors Be Paid to Save Lives? An
Assessment of the Legal Ban on Donor Compensation and Other Obstacles
Facing Domestic and International Bone Marrow Registries, 24 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 477, 478 (2010); Oudshoorn et al., supra note 37, at 405 (“The idea
of a European donor registry did not materialize but it developed into the
Dutch unrelated hematopoietic stem cell donor registry called
Europdonor . . . .”); van Rood & Oudshoorn, supra note 40, at 1.
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need of a transplant.94 Despite these efforts and the success of
transplants involving HLA matched siblings, facilitating
unrelated transplants proved to be difficult due to the limited
number of HLA-typed donors in registries and the diversity of
HLA.
Although there are anecdotal reports of successful HSC
transplants using unrelated HLA-matched donors as early as
1973,95 the first successful HSC transplant to be reported in a
clinical journal occurred in 1979.96 Further success at matching
unrelated donors and recipients occurred, and by 1986 the
ANBMR had facilitated fourteen HSC transplants. 97 In 1987,
the United States followed Europe’s example, and founded the
National Bone Marrow Donor Registry as a cooperative effort of
the American Red Cross, Council of Community Blood Centers,
and United States Navy to facilitate voluntary, unrelated donor
marrow transplants. 98 One year later, individuals from the
United States, London, and the Netherlands organized the
Cooperative Marrow Donor Program to establish guidelines
and promote transplants between donors and patients in
different countries. 99 This organization created the Bone
Marrow Donors Worldwide (BMDW) international registry and
served as the impetus for the founding of the World Marrow
Donor Association (WMDA) in 1994. 100 Unrelated donor

94. See Confer et al., supra note 44, at 545; Oudshoorn et al., supra note
37, at 405 (“[T]he Anthony Nolan Trust . . . was the first active bone marrow
donor registry.”); Petersdorf, supra note 37, at 807 (explaining that Shirley
Nolan’s son, Anthony, was diagnosed with Wiskott-Aldrich Syndrome for
which transplantation was the only known cure); Our History, ANTHONY
NOLAN REGISTRY, http://www.anthonynolan.org/about-us/our-history (last
visited Oct. 4, 2014) [hereinafter ANTHONY NOLAN REGISTRY].
95. Horowitz, supra note 16, at 18 nn.1–2; ANTHONY NOLAN REGISTRY,
supra note 94.
96. Thomas, supra note 80, at 6 (citing J. A. Hansen et al.,
Transplantation of Marrow from an Unrelated Donor to a Patient with Acute
Leukemia, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 565, 565–67 (1980)) (“Quite by chance, it
was observed that one of the hematology technicians had an HLA type that
matched the patient.”).
97. ANTHONY NOLAN REGISTRY, supra note 94.
98. Warkentin & Shpall, supra note 43, at 542.
99. See Petersdorf, supra note 37, at 807. In 1988, there were eight active
registries with about 150,000 donors around the world. van Rood &
Oudshoorn, supra note 40, at 1–2.
100. See Petersdorf, supra note 37, at 807.
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registries across the world collaborate through the WMDA to
facilitate the international exchange of HSCs for transplant.101
Historically, the primary source of HSCs for transplant
was bone marrow, although HSCs were also known to be
present in umbilical cord blood as well as in the peripheral
blood of adults. 102 Cord blood was first used as a source of
HSCs for transplant in 1988, when a sibling’s cord blood was
successfully transplanted and reestablished hematopoiesis in a
child with Fanconi’s anemia.103 The success of this transplant
prompted the opening of the first public cord bank in 1991,
which was followed by numerous other cord blood banks
opening around the world.104 Public cord blood banks facilitated
the first unrelated donor HSC transplant using cord blood in
1996.105 The use of cord blood has steadily increased such that

101. Confer et al., supra note 44, at 545; Petersdorf, supra note 37, at 807;
BONE MARROW DONORS WORLDWIDE, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 (2013), available
at http://www.bmdw.org/uploads/media/BMDW2012.pdf (providing a list of
HLA phenotypes and other relevant data of unrelated volunteer HSC donors;
participants pay an operation fee to have data files uploaded into BMDW).
102. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
STEM CELL INFORMATION: HEMATOPOIETIC STEM CELLS (2001), available at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scireport/pages/chapter5.aspx. The presence of
HSCs in the peripheral blood capable of reestablishing hematopoiesis in mice
was shown in the early 1960s. See Armitage, supra note 16, at 9; Schmitz,
supra note 62, at 618. The existence of HSCs in the peripheral blood was
postulated as early as 1909. Schmitz, supra note 62, at 618 (citing A.
Maximow, Der Lymphozyt als gemeinsame Stammzelle der verschiedenen
Blutelemente in der embryonalen Entwicklung und im postfetalen Leben der
Saugetiere, 8 FOLIA HAEMAT 125 (1909) (Ger.)). The idea of using HSCs from
umbilical cord blood for transplantation was first proposed in 1982.
Broxmeyer & Smith, supra note 51, at 559.
103. Ballen et al., supra note 37, at 492–93 (explaining that the sibling
whose cord blood was used underwent prenatal diagnosis of not having
Fanconi’s anemia and was HLA matched, and twenty-five years later the
patient was healthy).
104. Carlo Petrini, Ethical Issues in Umbilical Cord Blood Banking: A
Comparative Analysis of Documents from National and International
Institutions, 53 TRANSFUSION 902, 902 (2013) (“[T]he New York Blood Center
was established as the first public [cord blood] bank . . . .”).
105. Ballen et al., supra note 37, at 493 (citing J. Kurtzberg et al.,
Placental Blood as a Source of Hematopoietic Stem Cells for Transplantation
into Unrelated Recipients, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157 (1996)).
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in 2012, twenty percent of unrelated HSC transplants
occurring through the United States registry use cord blood.106
Despite initial concerns that HSCs collected from
peripheral blood would result in a greater likelihood of GVHD
due to higher levels of T-cells in the sample, multiple studies
published in 1995 reported acceptable levels of GVHD.107 The
use of HSCs from peripheral blood rapidly increased following
these studies and in 2012, sixty percent of unrelated HSC
transplants occurring through the United States registry used
HSCs collected from peripheral blood.108
Advances in molecular biology and genetics in the 1980s
and 1990s resulted in significant enhancements in HLA
matching.109 In the early 1970s, scientists were only testing for
one form of HLA.110 In the 1980s, antigen testing had increased
to three HLA forms.111 By the 1990s, precise DNA matching
was being used to match five HLA forms.112
Unlike in the past, where HSC transplants were thought of
as desperate measures to treat advanced disease, HSC
transplants are often used as the first or second line of therapy
for many conditions today. 113 Moreover, instead of HSCs
primarily being obtained from bone marrow, transplants today
use HSCs from a variety of sources. 114 Furthermore, the
106. Donor Registry Data, supra note 2 (showing that in 2012 HRSA
recorded transplants using the following HSC sources: 1150 using bone
marrow, 3492 using peripheral blood, and 1191 using cord blood).
107. See Horowitz, supra note 16, at 18; Schmitz, supra note 62, at 622
(citing W. I. Bensinger et al., Transplantation of Allogeneic Peripheral Blood
Stem Cells Mobilized by Recombinant Human Granulocyte Colony-Stimulating
Factor, 85 BLOOD 1655 (1995); M. Körbling et al., Allogeneic Blood Stem Cell
Transplantation for Refractory Leukemia and Lymphoma: Potential
Advantage of Blood over Marrow Allografts, 85 BLOOD 1659 (1995); N.
Schmitz et al., Primary Transplantation of Allogeneic Peripheral Blood
Progenitor Cells Mobilized by Filgrastim (Granulocyte Colony-Stimulating
Factor), 85 BLOOD 1666 (1995)).
108. Horowitz, supra note 16, at 18; Schmitz, supra note 62, at 618; Donor
Registry Data, supra note 2.
109. See Mickelson & Petersdorf, supra note 87, at 151–53.
110. See id. at 151, 157.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Horowitz, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining that in the 1970s 60% of
HSC transplants involved patients with advanced disease, whereas in 2006
only 20% of such patients had advanced disease).
114. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text.
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sharing of HSC across international borders as facilitated by
WMDA has also been a success. In 2008, forty-four percent of
HSC transplants in the world involved HSCs crossing
international borders. 115 Despite this international exchange
and the improving likelihood of finding matched HSC donors,
many patients are unable to find a matching donor.116
C. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM FOR UNRELATED HSC
DONATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The HRSA, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for the C.W. Bill
Young Cell Transplantation Program, which includes a registry
of HSC donors as well as a national inventory of cord blood.117
HRSA administers the transplantation program through
contracts with nonprofit organizations.118 The National Marrow
Donor Program (NMDP) holds three of these contracts with
HRSA through which it is responsible for coordinating
transplants of HSCs from bone marrow, peripheral blood, and
cord blood, as well as administering the electronic database to
match donors and recipients. 119 NMDP contracts with third
party organizations and health practitioners to recruit donors,
coordinate the transplants, and perform medical services
including testing of donors and retrieving HSCs.120 NMDP also
operates Be the Match, which provides support for patients and

115. L. M. Foeken et al., Monitoring the International Use of Unrelated
Donors for Transplantation: The WMDA Annual Reports, 45 BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION 811, 818 (2010).
116. Id. at 817–18; Need for More Donors, supra note 2.
117. About the Program, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
118. Program Contractors, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/contractors/index.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2014).
119. Legislation & Contracts, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/legislation_and_contracts/index.htm
l (last visited Oct. 14, 2014); Program Contractors, supra note 118.
120. NAT’L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM & SUBSIDIARY, CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL CONSOLIDATING INFORMATION AS
OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 AND 2012, AND
INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS’
REPORT
8–10
(2014),
available
at
http://bethematch.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1928.
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recruits people to join the Be the Match Registry.121 The Be the
Match Foundation provides financial support for patients
struggling with uninsured transplant costs.122
Prior to 1986, there was no national bone marrow registry
in the United States and only around 10,000 individuals had
been HLA-typed.123 In 1984, Congress directed the Secretary of
HHS to hold a conference on the feasibility of establishing a
national registry for bone marrow transplants. 124 The
technology assessment panel recommended against funding a
national registry, as did the Secretary of HHS. 125 Congress
then directed the Navy Medical Research Institute to begin a
registry on its own. 126 In 1987, the National Bone Marrow
Donor Registry was established, began operating, and
conducted its first transplant.127 The registry was administered
under a government contract by the Red Cross. 128 In 1988,
HHS took over responsibility for the registry and the program
name was changed to the NMDP.129
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Conference Report, Nat’l Insts. of Health Consensus Dev. Program,
Donor Registries for Bone Marrow Transplantation (May 13–15, 1985),
http://consensus.nih.gov/1985/1985bonemarrowregistriesta002html.htm.
124. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat.
2339, 2347.
125. Anderson, supra note 32, at 485 n.25 (citing 132 CONG. REC. S6280
(daily ed. May 21, 1986)); Conference Report, supra note 123.
126. Anderson supra note 32, at 485 n.25 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-530, at 15
(2d Sess. 1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4625, 4634 WL 201779).
127. About Us, BE THE MATCH, http://bethematch.org/About-Us/Our-story/
(last visited Oct. 14, 2014); Jane E. Brody, New Registry Is Raising Hope for
Those in Need of Bone Marrow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1988, at C6 (reporting
that a six-year-old with rapidly progressing leukemia was the national
registry’s first beneficiary).
128. COMM. ON ESTABLISHING A NAT’L CORD BLOOD STEM CELL BANK
PROGRAM, INST. OF MED., CORD BLOOD: ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL
HEMATOPOIETIC STEM CELL BANK PROGRAM 24 (Emily Ann Meyer et al. eds.,
2005); National Bone Marrow Registry Is Seeking Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1987, at C12.
129. COMM. ON ESTABLISHING A NAT’L CORD BLOOD STEM CELL BANK
PROGRAM, INST. OF MED., supra note 128, at 4–5; Organ Transplant
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3116 (1988) (explaining
that HHS is to administer the registry). The Naval Medical Research Center
retained and still operates the portion of the registry pertaining to the
military community. H.R. REP. NO. 112-110, at 232 (2012) (“Department of
Defense [donor center] volunteers and provides more marrow donors per week
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In 1990, the NMDP became a separate nonprofit
organization and took over administration from the Red Cross;
additionally, Congress established requirements for the
operation of the registry and consolidated all registries in the
country.130 Although the NMDP was originally established to
match donors of HSCs from bone marrow, it expanded its scope
to cover cord blood banks in 1998 and to offer HSCs from
peripheral blood in 1999.131
The National Cord Blood Inventory program (NCBI),
established in 2005, provides federal funding to support the
banking of diverse and high quality, publicly available cord
blood units. 132 Cord blood banks funded through the NCBI
must list the units collected with government subsidy on the
registry operated by the NMDP.133
II. REGULATION OF THE SALE OF HSCS
There are multiple laws, regulations, and rules that affect
HSC donor compensation. Federal law currently only prohibits
the sale of HSCs from bone marrow for transplant where the
transaction affects interstate commerce. 134 A quarter of the
states have prohibited the sale of bone marrow,135 while only
than any other donor center in the Nation.”); Bone Marrow Registry, NAVAL
MED. RES. CENTER, http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/Pages/bmr_main.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
130. Transplant Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-616, § 101, 104
Stat. 3279; COMM. ON ESTABLISHING A NAT’L CORD BLOOD STEM CELL BANK
PROGRAM, INST. OF MED., supra note 128.
131. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, GAO-03-182, BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTS: DESPITE
RECRUITMENT SUCCESSES, NATIONAL PROGRAM MAY BE UNDERUTILIZED 6
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03182.pdf.
132. Stem Cell Therapeutic and Research Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-129,
119 Stat. 2250; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-23, NATIONAL
CORD BLOOD INVENTORY: PRACTICES FOR INCREASING AVAILABILITY FOR
TRANSPLANTS AND RELATED CHALLENGES 1–2 (2011), available at
http://gao.gov/assets/590/585682.pdf.
133. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 132, at 2–3.
134. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat.
2346 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006)).
135. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-34-102(18), 12-34-116 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 2710(10), 2713(f) (2003); D.C. CODE § 7-1501.01 (2012 LexisNexis);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-160 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-20 (West
Supp. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-1 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.10204(1) (West 2012); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §4307(1) (McKinney
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Delaware prohibits the sale of HSCs from peripheral blood and
cord blood. 136 National and international accreditation
organizations also have policies impacting the sale of HSCs.137
A. FEDERAL
1. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
The primary focus of NOTA was to create a national
system of solid organ procurement, allocation, and distribution
in an effort to make organs more widely available and improve
donor-recipient matching.138 NOTA also contained a prohibition
on the sale of organs for transplant providing: “It shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration
for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce.”139
Bone marrow was not included in the initial version of the
bill for NOTA when it was first introduced in the Senate, or in
a similar bill previously introduced in the House.140 Multiple
hearings on organ transplantation were held; however, the only
mention of adding bone marrow to the definition of “human
organ” was in two letters read by the House Committee on
Ways and Means.141 In both letters the writing physicians cited
2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-30-102(17), 68-30-401 (LexisNexis 2013); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02(a) (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.16 (West
2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-19-3(21), 16-19-16 (LexisNexis 2011); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 146.345 (West 2006).
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2710(10), 2713(f) (2003).
137. See infra Part II.C.
138. See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98
Stat. 2339, 3975, 3977; Harry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of
Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 59 (1989); John
A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program: When Push
Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 197, 206 (1994). HHS
became responsible for the program of organ allocation and distribution in a
nationwide system for matching donors and recipients, while regional
organizations were created to locate potential donors and coordinate the
acquisition and transport of organs. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(a)–(b) (2012).
139. National Organ Transplant Act § 301.
140. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Act, S. 2048, 98th Cong.
(1983) (as introduced Nov. 3, 1983); Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Act, H.R. 4080, 98th Cong. (1983) (as introduced Oct. 5, 1983).
141. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the H.
Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 171
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the need for a national system for matching bone marrow
donors and requesting that bone marrow be added to the
definition of human organ.142 Although one letter did mention
the need to prevent patients from offering large sums of money
to potential donors, both seemed to advocate the addition of
bone marrow to the definition of human organ in order to seek
federal funding for a national registry to match bone marrow
donors.143
The Senate report from the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources recommended adding bone marrow to the
definition of human organ in S. 2048.144 Although the report
did not discuss the reasons for the addition, it provided some
insight into the committee’s rationale, stating: “It is the sense
of the Committee that individuals or organizations should not
profit by the sale of human organs for transplantation. This is
not meant to include blood and blood derivatives, which can be
replenished and whose donation does not compromise the
health of the donor.” 145 The final version of NOTA included
bone marrow in the definition of human organ as well as
funding for studying the feasibility of a national registry for
HSC transplants. 146 Since its enactment, two amendments
have been made to the definition of “human organ” in NOTA;147
(1984) [hereinafter Braine Letter] (letter of Hayden G. Braine, Director, John
Hopkins Oncology Center); id. at 170–71 [hereinafter Owens Letter] (letter of
Albert H. Owens, Director, John Hopkins Oncology Center).
142. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
143. Braine Letter, supra note 141 (“Fiscal support such as envisioned in
H.R. 4080 would greatly accelerate this process and remove marrow donation
from commercialism.”); Owens Letter, supra note 141 (“It will be especially
helpful to have a network which will facilitate the prompt distribution of
organs to patients in desperate need . . . . A national registry of tissue typed
donors and a distribution network would aid immeasurably in treating
afflicted individuals effectively.”).
144. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 13, 16–17 (1984).
145. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C § 274e(c)(1) (2012). This feasibility study recommended
against a national marrow registry. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 7, 8 (1984)
(Conf. Rep.); 130 CONG. REC. H11,087, H11,087–88 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Waxman) (showing that funding for the study of a national
registry of volunteer bone marrow donors was added to S. 2048 by an October
1984 conference report); supra notes 124–26.
147. Health Omnibus Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, §§ 401–08,
102 Stat. 3048 (amending 42 U.S.C § 274e(c)(1) to include any subpart of any
listed organ as well as fetal organs and subparts thereof in the definition of
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additionally, HHS has recently proposed another amendment
to include all HSCs under the definition.148
NOTA contains limited exceptions to the definition of
valuable consideration. Organ donors may be reimbursed for
the “expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the
donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the
organ.” 149 Additionally, there are exceptions for “reasonable
payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and
storage of a human organ.”150 Thus, physicians, hospitals, and
other organizations involved in the retrieval and transplant
process are permitted to be compensated and earn a profit.151
It is generally accepted that the prohibition in NOTA does
not apply to blood, semen, or ova.152 Congress’ intent to exclude
blood and blood products is evident in multiple reports
including a conference report, which stated that, “[t]he term
‘human organ’ is not intended to include replenishable tissues
such as blood or sperm.”153 As a result, donors of blood products
are not prohibited by federal law from receiving valuable
consideration in exchange for their donation.154
As detailed above, HSCs to be used for transplant may be
obtained from bone marrow, cord blood, or peripheral blood.155
HSCs from bone marrow involve the collection and transfer of
human organ); Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 78 Fed.
Reg. 40,033 (July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121) (amending the
definition of organs, effective July 3, 2014, to include vascularized composite
allografts, such as tissue with blood vessels, like hands).
148. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ,” supra note 7, at
60,810–12; see also infra text accompanying notes 161–62.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2). In 2004, an amendment to NOTA established a
grant program for the reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses
incurred by individuals making living donations. Organ Donation and
Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, § 3, 118 Stat. 584 (2004)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 274f).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 252–56 (discussing how Be the
Match spends a considerable amount of money paying for medical services).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45.
153. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); see also supra note
144 (identifying blood and blood derivatives as separate from the definition of
organs because they can be replenished).
154. Blood donations for transplantation are regulated by the FDA. See
infra Part II.A.2.
155. See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.

2015]

HIDDEN ECONOMY

241

bone marrow, and will thus fall under the definition of human
organ in NOTA and cannot be transferred in exchange for
valuable consideration. 156 However, HSCs from peripheral
blood and cord blood do not involve the transfer of any body
part contained in the current definition of human organ in
NOTA as they merely involve the donation of blood. 157 The
Ninth Circuit Court in Flynn v. Holder 158 held that HSCs
collected from peripheral blood did not fall under the definition
of bone marrow or human organ in NOTA;159 as a result, NOTA
does not criminalize compensating donors who donate HSCs by
peripheral blood apheresis. 160 As HSCs obtained from cord
blood also do not involve the donation of bone marrow, one can
intimate that a court would also find that they do not fall under
the definition of human organ in NOTA.
In response to the Ninth Circuit Court decision in Flynn,
HHS has proposed to amend the definition of human organ in
NOTA to include “bone marrow and other hematopoietic
stem/progenitor cells without regard to the method of their
collection.”161 If this proposed rule is accepted, all HSCs will
fall under the NOTA prohibition regardless of their method of
collection.162 In its proposed rule, HHS purports to justify the
change based on the need to: prevent economic exploitation of
recipients, uphold the Congressional intent to ban
commodification of HSCs, curb coercion and exploitation,
encourage altruistic donation, and decrease the likelihood of
disease transmission.163
2. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
The FDA regulates human cells intended for transplant
into a human recipient as human cells, tissues, and cellular

156. See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98
Stat. 2339, 2346–47 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012)).
157. See id.
158. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012).
159. Id. at 865.
160. Id. at 864–65.
161. Change to the Definition of “Human Organ,” supra note 7, at 60,811–
12.
162. Id. at 60,812.
163. Id. at 60,811–12.
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based products (HCT/Ps).164 HSCs derived from peripheral and
cord blood are regulated as HCT/Ps.165 However, it is unclear
whether HSCs derived from bone marrow fall under the FDA’s
HCT/Ps regulations. Even though HHS and the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) have taken
the position that body parts meeting the definition of “human
organ” in NOTA are automatically excluded from FDA HCT/Ps
regulations, this position is not supported by the FDA
regulations which broadly define HCT/Ps and only expressly
exclude “vascularized human organs”—not the NOTA
definition of “human organ.” 166 Moreover, as FDA HCT/Ps
regulations specifically exclude “minimally manipulated bone
marrow for homologous use” from the definition of HCT/Ps, one
logical inference from this specific exclusion is that all other
bone marrow falls under the regulations.167
FDA regulations govern the eligibility of donors of HCT/Ps,
and set out screening and testing requirements; however,
exceptions to some testing requirements may be obtained in
cases of urgent need. 168 The FDA does not impose any
restrictions on donors receiving compensation in exchange for
HCT/P donations, nor does it impose any labeling requirements
on the products.169

164. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1270, 1271 (2014).
165. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(2).
166. 21 C.F.R. § 1270.3(j)(4); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(2)(i); 78 Fed. Reg.
40,033, 40,034 (July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121) (“Once a body
part is defined as an organ under the OPTN final rule, such body parts are
excluded from the coverage of FDA regulations governing HCT/Ps, 21 CFR
§ 1271.3(d)(1).”).
167. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(2)(iv).
168. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.60(d)(1). The FDA has a mechanism for collecting
human cellular products from ineligible donors where the transplant
physician determined there is an “urgent medical need,” such as where a
suitable donor or graft source is not readily available and the risks of
alternative therapies are greater than the risks of proceeding with an
ineligible donor. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.60(d), 1271.65(b); Confer et al., supra note
44, at 546; see Lown & Shaw, supra note 4, at 213 (“[I]n practice use of [HSCs]
from such donors may be permitted, including imports from the United
Kingdom.”).
169. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.
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Whole blood and blood components are regulated by the
FDA in a process separate from the regulation of HCT/Ps.170
FDA regulations require that blood, to be used in transfusion,
be labeled indicating whether it was collected from a paid or
voluntary donor.171 The labeling requirements do not prohibit
the sale of blood. 172 Furthermore, even donors who receive
valuable consideration in the form of rewards may still be
categorized as a “voluntary donor” as long as the reward is not
a monetary payment.173
B. STATE LAWS
Although states have jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
HSCs within their borders, few have chosen to exercise such
jurisdiction.174 States began enacting laws prohibiting the sale
of bodies in the 1960s.175 However, the laws that were enacted
170. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(2) (excluding blood from the definition of
HCT/Ps).
171. 21 C.F.R. § 606.121(c)(8)(v) (1994) (applying to whole blood or fresh
frozen plasma). The practice of paying for plasma and not whole blood in the
United States may in part be explained by the fact that labeling requirements,
indicating a donor’s status as paid or unpaid, do not apply to blood products
that will not be used for transfusion such as source plasma to be processed
into plasma products. See 21 C.F.R. § 606.121(c)(8)(v); CPG sec. 230.150 Blood
Donor Classification Statement, Paid or Volunteer Donor, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicy
GuidanceManual/ucm122798.htm, (last updated Sept. 18, 2014).
172. 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (providing no explicit ban or criminal provision for
sales inconsistent with requirements).
173. 21 C.F.R. § 606.121(c)(8)(v)(B)–(C) (“(B) A volunteer donor is a person
who does not receive monetary payment for a blood donation. (C) Benefits,
such as time off from work, membership in blood assurance programs, and
cancellation of nonreplacement fees that are not readily convertible to cash, do
not constitute monetary payment within the meaning of this paragraph.”);
CPG sec. 230.150 Blood Donor Classification Statement, Paid or Volunteer
Donor, supra note 171 (listing incentives that are generally not transferable
and would therefore not require a “paid donor” label: product promotional
CDs, frequent flyer miles, medical tests performed at the same time as
donation such as cholesterol screenings, scholarships where the money goes
directly to the school, and gift cards and gift certificates bearing the donor’s
name).
174. See Warkentin & Shpall, supra note 43, at 536 (describing the few
state regulatory schemes for human cellular therapy).
175. From 1961 to 1968, six states (Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and New York) enacted legislation prohibiting the
receipt of compensation in exchange for the distribution of one’s body after
death. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
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in 1968 and earlier, prohibiting individuals from receiving
compensation for directing the distribution of their body after
death, would not have affected the sale of HSCs for transplant
as they did not apply to the sale of living body parts.176 The
National Commission on Uniform State Laws subsequently
drafted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1968,
which set out procedures to donate one’s organs for transplant
after death.177 The 1968 UAGA did not prohibit the purchase
and sale of organs,178 and was enacted by all fifty states and
the District of Columbia.179 All of the states that already had
legislation prohibiting individuals from receiving compensation
in exchange for organs repealed such legislation when they
enacted the 1968 UAGA.180 Delaware was the only state that
reenacted a provision prohibiting compensation in exchange for
body parts for transplant within their version of the 1968
UAGA.181
176. Act of Aug. 1, 1968, ch. 429, § 1780(b), 56 Del. Laws 1773 (repealed
1970) (“A person who so directs the manner in which his body shall be
disposed of after death shall receive no remuneration or other thing of value
for such disposition.”); Act of May 20, 1967, Act 94, § 50F-1, 1967 Haw. Sess.
Laws 91 (repealed 1969) (“Every person . . . may provide for the disposition of
his body after death . . . provided that no person shall receive remuneration or
anything of value for such disposition of his body.”); Act of Apr. 24, 1961, ch.
315, § 149(b), 1961 Md. Laws 397, 398 (repealed 1968) (voiding an instrument
directing the disposition of organs after death “if obtained for a monetary
consideration”); Act of June 12, 1967, ch. 353, 1967 Mass. Acts 202 (repealed
1971) (prohibiting payment of compensation for an anatomical gift); Act of
Apr. 9, 1963, ch. 293 § 11, 1963 Nev. Stat. 532 (repealed 1969) (prohibiting the
anatomical committee from entering into any contract where any sum of
money is paid to a living person in exchange for the person’s body when they
die); Law of Apr. 22, 1964, ch. 702, § 4201(2), 1964 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1117
(McKinney) (repealed 1970) (prohibiting remuneration for distribution after
death).
177. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 4, 8A U.L.A. 129 (2014).
178. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 3, 8A U.L.A. 126 cmt. para. 3
(“The statutes in a few states specify that no donor shall ask compensation
and no donee shall receive it . . . . On the other hand, most of the states
seemingly are not concerned over the profit motive and no mention is made of
it. The Uniform Act follows the latter course in this regard.”).
179. Sten, supra note 138, at 205 (stating that all fifty states and the
District of Columbia had enacted the 1968 Uniform Act by 1973).
180. See supra note 176.
181. Act of May 20, 1970, ch. 445, § 1783(f), 57 Del. Laws 1252 (1970);
Susan Hankin Denise, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV.
1015, 1023 n.82 (1985) (“Delaware was alone in adding a sales prohibition to
its version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.”).
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Unlike the 1968 UAGA, the following two UAGAs, released
in 1987 and 2006, prohibited the purchase and sale of organs
for transplant.182 Unlike NOTA, where the federal prohibition
applies evenly across the country, many current state
prohibitions vary from the UAGA’s and differ state to state.183
State laws vary in prohibiting compensation for HSCs obtained
from different sources, such as bone marrow, peripheral blood,
or cord blood. 184 Every state, except Maine, has legislation
prohibiting the sale of a type of body part (most commonly solid
organs); however, only a few states have prohibitions that
prevent the exchange of HSCs for compensation. 185 The only
state to prohibit the sale of HSCs from peripheral blood and
cord blood is Delaware. 186 Legislation in twelve states
(Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New
York, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia prohibit the exchange
of compensation for HSCs collected from bone marrow.187
C. ACCREDITING ORGANIZATIONS AND REGISTRY
REQUIREMENTS
International collaboration in the area of HSC
transplantation has been historically important and continues
to be important today.188 The ability to utilize HSCs from an
international pool of donors has increased the probability of a

182. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2014) (“A
person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or sell a part
for transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur after
the death of the decedent.”); REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) §
16, 8A U.L.A. 133 (2014).
183. See infra Table 1.
184. See infra Table 1.
185. The prohibition against sale of tissue in thirty-four states only applies
to tissue from parts that are collected after death. HSC collections only occur
from living donors, thus, the prohibitions in those thirty-four states do not
apply to HSCs. See infra Table 1.
186. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2710(10), 2713(f) (2003).
187. See supra note 135; see also infra Table 1.
188. A series of international meetings fostering international
collaboration was imperative in historical advancements in HLA matching.
See Mickelson & Petersdorf, supra note 87, at 145–46, 150–51. Potential pools
of unrelated donors have been enlarged through international collaboration.
See Confer et al., supra note 44, at 545; see supra notes 93, 99 and
accompanying text.
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patient finding a matching donor.189 International matches are
facilitated through BMDW, which requires participating
registries to be accredited through inspection of the HSC source
and to ensure they meet international standards.190
The WMDA runs an accreditation program for HSC donor
registries and accredits registries responsible for seventy-five
percent of HSC donors and units accessible through BMDW.191
The WMDA largely does not promulgate specific standards for
the operation of collection centers, but focuses on regulating the
registry itself and requires that registries demonstrate the
safety and effectiveness of activities, usually by requiring
further
accreditation
from
another
organization. 192
Organizations that accredit collection centers and other aspects
of HSC donation are often regionally based; the Foundation for
the Accreditation of Cellular Therapy (FACT) is based in the
United States, and the Joint Accreditation CommitteeInternational Society for Cellular Therapy and European
Group for Blood and Marrow Transplantation (JACIE) is based
in Europe. 193 FACT and JACIE collaborated to create
international standards covering the collection, processing, and
administration of HSCs and other cellular therapy products.194

189. OneMatch Information Package, CAN. BLOOD SERVS., http://forms
.blood.ca/CentreApps/Internet/UW_V502_MainEngine.nsf/printpageview/BD6
A6071B47F336F852573670054AE78?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 4,
2014).
190. On Participation and Authorization, BONE MARROW DONORS
WORLDWIDE, http://www.bmdw.org/index.php?id=registry_info (last visited
Sept. 29, 2014) (requiring adherence to WMDA standards, which include
inspection).
191. Standards and Accreditation, WORLD MARROW DONOR ASS’N,
http://www.worldmarrow.org/index.php?id=488 (last visited Oct. 4, 2014)
(requiring paper-based review and onsite inspection).
192. C. K. Hurley et al., Standards, Regulations and Accreditation for
Registries Involved in the Worldwide Exchange of Hematopoietic Stem Cell
Donors and Products, 45 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 819, 820 (2010).
193. Warkentin & Shpall, supra note 43, at 536–37, 539 (describing
creation of FACT and JACIE and accreditation processes in different countries
and regions).
194. Id. at 537; see FOUND. FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF CELLULAR
THERAPY, UNIV. OF NEB. MED. CTR. & JOINT ACCREDITATION COMM. ISCT &
EBMT, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR CELLULAR THERAPY PRODUCT
COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND ADMINISTRATION (5th ed. 2012), available at
http://www.factwebsite.org/FACTWeb/Document_Library/Fifth_Edition_Cellul
ar_Therapy_Standards_Version_5_3.aspx.
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Additionally, NetCord, an association of umbilical cord banks,
and FACT collaborated to provide international standards on
cord blood. 195 Accreditation with the above-mentioned
organizations is voluntary; in the United States, FACT
accreditation is a factor in the U.S. News and World Report
ranking of hospitals.196
Some of the aforementioned organizations have standards
involving the compensation of HSC donors. The WMDA lists
donor rights, including that “[d]onors must not be paid for their
donation but may be reimbursed for expenses incurred during
the donation process, for example, time lost from work or travel
to the collection centre.”197 This provision, although arguably
not much of a “right,” is similar to the prohibition and
exception in NOTA, which only allows valuable consideration
for donor expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred
in connection with the donation.198 FACT-JACIE weighed in on
the issue of compensation of donors in their guidance on the
standards applicable to the collection of HSCs from peripheral
blood and bone marrow stating that: “Clinical programs
performing allogeneic transplantation should endeavor to
receive only voluntary and unpaid donation of cells. Donors
may receive compensation, which is strictly limited to making
good the expenses and inconveniences related to the
donation.”199
195. See FOUND. FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF CELLULAR THERAPY, UNIV.
OF NEB. MED. CTR., NETCORD-FACT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR CORD
BLOOD COLLECTION, BANKING, AND RELEASE FOR ADMINISTRATION (5th ed.
2013) [hereinafter NETCORD & FACT], available at http://www.factweb
.org/forms/store/ProductFormPublic/search?action=1&Product_productNumbe
r=627.
196. What FACT Accreditation Means to Patients and Their Families,
FACT, http://www.factwebsite.org/Inner.aspx?id=351 (last visited Oct. 4,
2014).
197. WORLD MARROW DONOR ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR
UNRELATED HEMATOPOIETIC PROGENITOR CELL DONOR REGISTRIES, pt. B, §
3.03, at 11 (2014), available at https://www.wmda.info/images/pdf/WMDA
Standards.pdf.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012).
199. INT’L STANDARDS FOR CELLULAR THERAPY PRODUCT COLLECTION,
PROCESSING, AND ADMINISTRATION ACCREDITATION MANUAL, pt. B, § B6.1,
explanation at 72 (FOUND. ACCRED. CELLULAR THERAPY, UNIV. NEB. MED.
CTR. & JOINT ACCRED. COMM. ISCT & EBMT, 5th ed. version 5.3, 2012),
available
at
http://www.factwebsite.org/uploadedFiles/FACT_News/Final
%20Draft%205th%20Edition%20Accreditation%20Manual.04.18.11.pdf.
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The FACT-JACIE guidance appears to permit donors to
receive a greater amount of compensation or reimbursement
than NOTA and WMDA by permitting the compensation of
donors for inconveniences related to the donation.200 Unlike the
FACT-JACIE guidance on the standards for HSCs, the
NetCord-FACT International Standards for Cord Blood
Collection, Banking, and Release for Administration do not
contain any mention of donor compensation.201
III. DONORS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO RECEIVE
COMPENSATION IN EXCHANGE FOR HSCS,
REGARDLESS OF THE SOURCE OF THE HSCS
Currently, NOTA prohibits donors from receiving valuable
consideration in exchange for HSCs obtained from bone
marrow. 202 Additionally, a current proposed rule from HHS
would expand the prohibition to include HSCs from any source,
and would thus encompass HSCs obtained from peripheral
blood as well as cord blood. 203 Congress and HHS have put
forth the following reasons for prohibiting compensation: (1)
“human body parts should not be viewed as commodities;”204 (2)
“individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale of
human organs for transplantation;” 205 (3) the altruistic
donation of organs should be promoted;206 and (4) compensation
would result in increased risks to donors and recipients. 207
However, such a prohibition of compensating HSC donors
cannot be justified on the basis of the aforementioned reasons.

200. Such payments for inconveniences could be significant. Cf. Ethics
Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 304, 308 (2007) (estimating payment of
$3360 to $4200 to oocyte donors would reflect compensation for the hours
spent in the clinic).
201. See NETCORD & FACT, supra note 195.
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
203. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ,” supra note 7.
204. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984); Change to the Definition of “Human
Organ,” supra note 7, at 60,812; see supra text accompanying note 145.
205. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16–17; see supra text accompanying note 145.
206. Change to the Definition of “Human Organ,” supra note 7, at 60,812.
207. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16–17.
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A. PERMITTING HSC DONORS TO BE COMPENSATED WILL NOT
CHANGE THE STATUS OF HSCS AS COMMODITIES
Commodity is a term that is used in a variety of ways.
Economists define a commodity as a good that is
interchangeable within a market as long as it meets certain
minimum standards. 208 Commodity is also defined in a more
general way, in the Oxford English Dictionary as “[a] kind of
thing produced for use or sale, an article of commerce, an object
of trade.”209 Regardless of which definition we accept as that
intended by Congress, permitting compensation for HSCs will
not result in a change in HSCs being viewed and treated either
as commodities or not as commodities.
The economic definition of commodity requires the good be
fully or partially fungible—that is, that the good is
interchangeable for other goods that meet similar quality
standards and that the source of the good is largely
irrelevant. 210 Examples of fungible goods include metals and
petroleum. 211 For example, as long as a metal meets certain
purity standards, it is irrelevant where the metal was mined,
processed, or sold.212 In terms of body parts, blood and blood
products such as plasma are fungible goods. 213 Type-A blood
that has met all of the requirements of the FDA is the same as
any other approved Type-A blood on the market.214 There is an
active market for blood, and blood is viewed and treated as a
commodity by those buying and selling.215

208. STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES FOR SALE: ETHICS AND EXPLOITATION IN
THE HUMAN BODY TRADE 46 (2003).
209. Commodity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view

/Entry/37205?redirectedFrom=commodity#eid (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
210. WILKINSON, supra note 208.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Anderson, supra note 32, at 478–79.
214. Breast milk is also likely treated as a commodity within the market,
particularly breast milk that has been treated and is sold through a milk
bank. It is arguable that breast milk that is sold directly from the producing
mother is not undifferentiated due to the lack of quality controls. See Sarah E.
Waldeck, Encouraging a Market in Human Milk, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
361, 385 (2002); ONLY THE BREAST, www.onlythebreast.com (last visited Oct.
4, 2014).
215. See Kieran Healey, The Emergence of HIV in the U.S. Blood Supply:
Organizations, Obligations, and the Management of Uncertainty, 28 THEORY &
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Solid human organs and tissue likely also meet the
economic based definition of commodity. Prior to advances in
immunosuppressants, a high level of HLA matching was
required between donors and recipients of solid organs and
tissues.216 However, with the requirement for HLA matching
reduced,
solid
organs
are
becoming
increasingly
interchangeable and are at least partially fungible and
therefore commodities.217 Even though there is no legal market
for the sale of human organs from a donor, there is
undoubtedly a market, albeit a highly regulated market, for
human organs once they have been removed from donors.218
Regardless of whether donors are legally allowed to receive
compensation for HSC donations, it is unlikely that HSCs
would ever be economic commodities due to the stringent need
for HLA matching and lack of interchangeability of HSCs. The
fact that the probability of finding a match in the general
population exceeds 1 in 20,000 demonstrates that HSCs are not
interchangeable, and would not meet the definition of
commodity regardless of whether they were paid for or not.219
Even though less stringency is required for the transplant of
HSCs from cord blood than HSCs from other sources, it is still
unlikely that such items would ever be considered to be
interchangeable.220
A broader interpretation of the definition of commodity is
often used wherein a commodity is defined as an “article of
commerce” or something that is purchased and sold.221 When
referring to the commodification of human organs, legal
academics often use a broad definition of commodity where a
SOC’Y 529, 530–31 (1999) (discussing policy shifts originating in the 1970s and
acknowledging the implications of an active market in blood).
216. Living Kidney Donation, Now . . . About Your Health, LIVING DONORS
ONLINE, http://www.livingdonorsonline.org/kidney/kidney4.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2014).
217. TILNEY, supra note 76, at 244–45 (noting the growth and
regularization of organ transplantation and clinics following success of
chemical immunosuppression); see infra note 218 and accompanying text.
218. Unrelated Donor: Procurement Costs, BE THE MATCH (Jan. 2014),
https://payor.bethematchclinical.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7502;
Sten, supra note 138, at 200–01.
219. Lown & Shaw, supra note 4, at 211 (stating that the chance of two
randomly selected Caucasian individuals being HLA matches are 1 in 20,000).
220. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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commodity is something that is purchased and sold.222 Many
body parts and products, including HSCs, meet this broad
definition of commodity because they are purchased and sold
and generally treated as articles of commerce.223 Regardless of
whether HSC donors are compensated, HSCs still meet this
broad definition of commodity as they are routinely purchased
and sold, especially on the international market.224
There are currently active markets for the purchase and
sale of numerous body parts and products that do not fall under
the definition of human organ in NOTA, including blood and
blood products, sperm, ova, and breast milk.225 Moreover, parts
that fall under the definition of human organ in NOTA are still
routinely sold in transactions, such as the sale of parts from
organ procurement organizations to tissue banks and the sale
of material from for-profit tissue processors to hospitals.226 It is
222. Anderson, supra note 32, at 494 (arguing that tissues and organs will
be commodified if donors are paid for them); John A. Robertson, Paid Organ
Donations and the Constitutionality of the National Organ Transplant Act, 40
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221, 269 (2013) (using the general definition of a
commodity as an article that is bought and sold); Nicolette Young, Altruism or
Commercialism? Evaluating the Federal Ban on Compensation for Bone
Marrow Donors, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1223–24 (2011) (conflating
commercialization with commodification).
223. See Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship over Body Parts,
21 J.L. & HEALTH 75, 77 (2008) (noting the tissue and body parts market had
grown to a $1 billion industry by 2003).
224. See CAN. BLOOD SERVS., A REPORT TO CANADIANS 2012/2013 52
(2013), available at http://video.bloodservices.ca/Annual2013/pdfs/cbs_ar2013
_finreport_en.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 65, at
3–4; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 132, at 12–14; Appel
Blue, supra note 223.
225. Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 384–85 (2004); Robertson, supra
note 222. The majority of the listed items are either capable of being
regenerated by the body (blood, milk, sperm); although a woman does not
regenerate ova, the donation of ova is not thought to deplete a woman of ova
she could have used, but rather stimulates additional ova to develop during a
cycle that would have otherwise not been used. See Williams et al., supra note
76, at 19.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2012) (“The term ‘valuable consideration’ does
not include the reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and
storage of a human organ . . . .”); Goodwin, supra note 225, at 383 (citing
William Heisel & Mark Karches, Organ Agencies Aid For-Profit Suppliers,
ORANGE COUNTRY REG., June 25, 2000, A01). The tissue industry is able to
recover high profits due to the fact that unlike solid organs, tissues do not
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hard to characterize sums paid by recipients of solid organs,
which are often more than double the hospital’s cost in
acquiring the organ, as anything other than a sale of the
organ.227
The sale of HSCs is routine in the United States.228 Within
the United States, hospitals purchase HSCs from cord blood
banks or through the Be the Match Registry.229 The charge to
hospitals for procuring HSCs through Be the Match currently
ranges from $30,000 to over $60,000. 230 HSCs can also be
purchased from cord blood banks; prices vary by bank as each
sets its own fees, and in 2011 the prices ranged from $22,800 to
$35,000. 231 The very nature of cord blood banking, in which
cord blood units are collected and stored for the very purpose of
being sold, demonstrates that their whole existence is for the
purpose of commodification. This commodification is sponsored
need to be transplanted immediately and can be heavily processed (by forprofit processors) and stored for long periods before transplantation. See
Laura A. Buck, Regulating Human Tissue Banks, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 121,
122, 125 (2007); Robert A. Katz, The Re-Gift of Life: Who Should Capture the
Value of Transplanted Human Tissue?, 18 HEALTH LAW. 14, 14 (2006);
Williams et al., supra note 76, at 34–37.
227. See Sten, supra note 138, at 200–01 (“[T]ransplant hospitals routinely
bill patients more than twice the hospital’s organ acquisition cost . . . .”).
Estimated average billed procurement charges in the United States in 2011
are: $80,400 per heart, $78,500 per intestine, $67,200 per kidney, $71,000 per
liver, $73,100 per single lung, $90,300 per double lung, and $65,000 per
pancreas. MILLMAN, 2011 U.S. ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANT COST
ESTIMATES AND DISCUSSION 4 (2011), available at http://us.milliman.com
/uploadedFiles/insight/research/health-rr/2011-us-organ-tissue.pdf. In addition
to the procurement charge, hospitals and physicians are also billing
significant amounts to perform the transplantations. Id.
228. See Unrelated Donor Search and Procurement, BE THE MATCH (Jan.
2014),
https://payor.bethematchclinical.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx
?id=7499.
229. Id.
230. Unrelated Donor: Procurement Costs, supra note 218 (“The cost of
procuring unrelated donor cells varies greatly depending on the cell type and
transplant protocol. These costs may be as low as $30,000 or higher than
$60,000 in cases where a patient requires two simultaneous infusions of cells,
such as a double cord blood transplant.”). In 2002, it was reported that the
cost of hospitals in the United States obtaining HSCs through the NMDP was
more than one and a half times as much as obtaining cells directly from
overseas registries. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 131, at 20.
231. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 132, at 14 (“[B]anks
received payments ranging from $22,800 to $35,000 for cord blood units used
for transplantation, with a median payment of $30,000.”).
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by the government through the NCBI program, which pays
cord banks a set subsidy for each cord blood unit the bank adds
to their publicly available inventory.232
HSCs are routinely sold within the United States, but
nowhere is the sale of HSCs more apparent than in
international transactions. Due to stringent HLA matching
requirements, many patients must look beyond their home
countries for a match.233 Forty-four percent of the world’s HSC
transplants between unrelated parties involve donors and
recipients from different countries. 234 In the United States,
more than fifty percent of transplants arranged through the
NMDP involve HSCs crossing international borders. 235
International registries each set their own price for HSC
products.236 Furthermore, this price is often more than the cost
of rendering the service to procure the HSCs and results in a
positive margin for the organization. 237 International
exchanges of HSCs are frequently referred to using the same
terminology as other international transactions, further
evidencing the treatment of HSCs as commodities.238
Congress may have enacted the prohibition in NOTA with
the intent of preventing human body parts from being viewed
and treated as commodities,239 however, NOTA has not stopped
virtually any body parts and body products from nonetheless
232. Id. at 12–14; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 65,
at 3–4.
233. Unrelated Donor Search and Procurement, supra note 228.
234. Foeken et al., supra note 115, at 812 (assessing the 10,481 adult stem
cell donations in 2008 between unrelated donors matched through registries in
thirty-eight countries).
235. Unrelated Donor Search and Procurement, supra note 228 (“Since the
NMDP Network includes several donor centers, transplant centers and
cooperative registries located outside of the United States, more than fifty
percent of all transplants facilitated by the NMDP involve either an
international donor or recipient.”).
236. Unrelated Donor: Procurement Costs, supra note 218.
237. The organization responsible for HSC transplants in Canada “bills the
international registries based on a set price list established annually by the
program, which covers more than the collection fees and donor expenses
incurred in rendering the services. The surplus generated by this scenario
offsets the deficit incurred in the international donor/Canadian patient
scenario.” CAN. BLOOD SERVS., supra note 224.
238. Id. at 52–53 (using “import,” “export,” and “foreign exchange
fluctuations”).
239. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984).
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being viewed and treated as commodities.240 Irrespective of the
definition used for commodity, providing compensation to HSC
donors will not result in a change in how HSCs are viewed and
treated either as commodities or not as commodities or
significantly change the profits already made today. Regardless
of whether compensation is provided for HSCs or not, HSCs are
unlikely to meet the narrow definition of commodity used by
economists as HSCs are not interchangeable. Moreover, despite
NOTA, HSCs already meet a broader definition of commodity,
as they are currently articles of commerce that are purchased
and sold by all parties other than the donor.241 The prohibition
in NOTA does not meet Congress’ aim to prevent the
commodification of HSCs from bone marrow and cannot be
justified on this basis. Likewise, the proposed expansion of the
prohibition to cover all HSCs can also not be justified,
especially as it applies to cord blood, which is collected and
stored solely for the purpose of being sold.242
B. PRECLUDING COMPENSATION FOR HSC DONATION TO
PREVENT DONOR PROFITING IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE HIDDEN
ECONOMY OF HSC DONATION WHERE ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN
HSC TRANSPLANTATION, EXCEPT THE DONOR, ARE
COMPENSATED AND MANY PROFIT
In 1984, when Congress enacted NOTA and noted the
importance of preventing individuals and organizations from
profiting by the sale of human organs, HSC transplantation
was very different than it is today. 243 HSC transplants were
rare and considered experimental.244 Most transplants occurred
between siblings, with very few unrelated transplants
occurring throughout the world.245 Although there was hope for
240. See Williams et al., supra note 76, at 34–37.
241. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
243. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16–17 (1984); see 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012); supra
text accompanying note 145.
244. Horowitz, supra note 16, at 17 (observing that few HSC
transplantations “were carried out before the 1970s” and “did not generate
much enthusiasm until the middle to late 1980s” but were “diffused rapidly in
the late 1980s”).
245. Even after over a decade of being in operation, the Anthony Nolan
Bone Marrow Registry in England only matched fourteen donors and patients
by 1986. See supra notes 94, 97 and accompanying text.
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the potential for HSC transplantation to materialize into a
routine procedure, that potential had not been achieved. Most
significantly, there were not a lot of profits being realized by
anyone in the area of HSC transplantation, so the intent to
prevent profiting was not an issue in 1984. 246 However, the
system surrounding HSC transplantation has evolved over the
years into an industry where for-profit entities are routine and
the compensation to members of nonprofit organizations is so
generous that it is difficult to distinguish from profit.247
Payments to individuals involved in HSC transplantation
are not prohibited by NOTA as long as they fall under the
reasonable payments exception for removal, processing,
storage, and transportation.248 As a result, the prohibition in
NOTA applies to donors, and has little impact on other parties
being compensated and profiting for their contributions.249 The
uneven treatment of donors and other individuals involved in
the process is inequitable and cannot be justified. Additionally,
this treatment is inconsistent with the intent of Congress that
organizations should not profit from the sale of organs for
transplant.250
Even though the most visible organization involved in HSC
transplant in the United States is a nonprofit, the NMDP and
the HSC transplantation industry in general have significant
involvement with for-profit entities. 251 In 2013, the NMDP
246. See Horowitz, supra note 16, at 17.
247. See National Marrow Donor Program, IRS Form 990, Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) 2 (2011),
available at http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2011/840/865/2011-84
0865803-087496e4-9.pdf (reporting annual salaries of NMDP officers as high
as $600,000).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (“The term ‘valuable consideration’ does not
include the reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ . . . .”). Although the exceptions permit “reasonable payments,”
academics have questioned whether significant profits in the tissue processing
area are in fact reasonable. See Buck, supra note 226, at 127–28; Katz, supra
note 226, at 14–17.
249. Although the prohibition currently only applies to HSCs from bone
marrow, because the recent proposed rule from HRSA would expand this
definition to include all HSCs, this section will address HSCs from all sources.
250. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16–17 (1984).
251. Many NMDP transplant centers are owned and operated by for-profit
corporations, such as Hospital Corporation of America. Facilities, HOSP. CORP.
AM., http://hcahealthcare.com/about/facilities.dot (last visited Jan. 2, 2015)
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spent over $175 million on medical services. 252 There is no
obligation that the companies providing these medical services
be nonprofit; physicians and other health care organizations
involved are likely profiting from these arrangements.253 Apart
from the services billed for by the NMDP, hospitals providing
transplant services to a recipient are able to profit from the
provision of these services. 254 There is no requirement that
such hospitals be nonprofit, and moreover, even a nonprofit
hospital may use the transplant unit as a profit center to offset
other less profitable areas.
The NMDP coordinates the use of cord blood for HSC
transplant, an area that utilizes for-profit organizations. 255
There is a misconception in the literature, and potentially in
the public at large, that cord blood banks with publicly
available units are all nonprofit.256 However, there are many
for-profit cord blood banks that store cord blood for public
(listing NMDP transplant centers “Presbyterian/St. Lukes Medical Center”
and “Sarah Cannon Blood and Marrow Transplant Program at TriStar
Centennial Medical Center”); Bob Herman, HCA’s Profit Up 35% in Q1, Down
Slightly
in
2013,
BECKER’S
HEALTHCARE
(Feb.
4,
2014),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/hca-s-profit-up-35-in-q4-down-s
lightly-in-2013.html; Nat’l Marrow Donor Program, Transplant Center
Directory, BE THE MATCH, http://bethematch.org/For-Patients-and-Families
/Getting-a-transplant/Choosing-a-transplant-center/U-S--transplant-centers/
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (listing facilities owned by Hospital Corporation of
America such as “Presbyterian/St. Lukes Medical Center” and “Sarah Cannon
Blood and Marrow Transplant Program at TriStar Centennial Medical
Center”). For more information on the administration of bone marrow
transplants in the United States, see supra notes 119–20 and accompanying
text.
252. NAT’L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM & SUBSIDIARY, supra note 120, at 5,
10 (“The Program procures medical services from third-party health
practitioners and clinics and pays for these services based on the Program’s
rate schedule or contractual agreements, where applicable.”).
253. NMDP contract standards for apheresis centers, collection centers,
cord blood banks, donor centers, recruitment groups, and transplant centers
stipulate quality and performance standards, but make no requirements on
business models. See generally Nat’l Marrow Donor Program, NMDP
Standards, BE THE MATCH, http://bethematch.org/about-us/global-transplantnetwork/standards/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
254. See, e.g., id.
255. NAT’L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM & SUBSIDIARY, supra note 120, at 8.
256. See, e.g., Petrini, supra note 104, at 903 (expressing a common
misconception that “[p]ublic [cord blood] banks that store units donated
voluntarily also generate considerable capital movements, albeit not for
profit”).
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use, 257 and additionally some of these companies are
compensated by HRSA for collecting cord blood for the NCBI.258
Because cord blood banks set their own prices for cord blood
units, there is a potential for these banks to make a significant
profit.259 Additionally, some nonprofit cord blood banks utilize
for-profit companies to collect and transport cord blood to their
banks. 260 This use of for-profit companies for collection and
transportation is analogous to the use of for-profit tissue
processing companies in the tissue banking industry,261 as they
both rely on the exceptions in NOTA for the payment of forprofit entities for items such as collection and processing. 262
Although, there have not been reports of a billion dollar
industry in HSC collection and processing, as there have been
for tissue banking, 263 many for-profit cord blood banks use
proprietary methods to collect and separate HSCs from the
cord blood, creating the potential for large processing fees

257. See, e.g., CELEBRATION STEM CELL CENTRE, http://celebration
stemcellcentre.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (operating both a public and
private cord blood bank); LIFEFORCE CRYOBANKS, https://www.lifeforce
cryobanks.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2014); Public Banking, STEMCYTE,
http://www.stemcyte.com/publicbanking (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (describing
its global mission to collect cord blood for public banking); Public Cord Blood
Bank, CORD:USE, http://publiccordbloodbank.corduse.com/about_cord_blood
_bank_difference.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (operating a private family
bank and a nonprofit foundation that provides grants, but is not involved in
the banking of cord blood); Questions & Answers, NUVACORD NETWORK (Aug.
17, 2012), https://nuvacord.net/cord-blood/qna (providing banking as well as
collection, transport, and processing services).
258. See National Cord Blood Inventory Program Contractors, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/about
/contractors/ncbi/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (noting that cord blood
banks with NCBI contracts include CORD:USE Public Cord Blood Bank and
StemCyte, Inc.).
259. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
260. See CORD:USE, PARENT’S GUIDE CORD BLOOD FOUND.,
http://parentsguidecordblood.org/bank/corduse (last visited Oct. 4, 2014)
(“Public donations collected by CORD:USE are sent to the Carolinas Cord
Blood Bank . . . .”); see also NuvaCord Network, PARENT’S GUIDE CORD BLOOD
FOUND.,
http://parentsguidecordblood.org/public/nuvacord-network
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2014) (“Cord blood donated through NuvaCord is sent to
Community Blood Services, aka New Jersey Cord Blood Bank, a public
bank . . . .”).
261. See Katz, supra note 226.
262. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
263. See Katz, supra note 226, at 17.
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similar to what is currently seen in the tissue bank industry.264
Academics have questioned whether the large profits accrued
in the tissue industry truly result from reasonable payments,
or if they might be non-compliant with the exception in
NOTA.265 If HHS is serious about cracking down on profiting
from HSC transplants, they might focus on these for-profit
entities while they are still in their infancy and set precedent
on a reasonable payment.
Even though the NMDP is a nonprofit, it has numerous
employees and board members that are compensated for their
work.266 In 2013, the NMDP and its subsidiary Be the Match
spent over sixty-one million dollars on compensation. 267
Additionally, eleven officers receive yearly compensation that
ranges from two hundred thousand dollars to over six hundred
thousand dollars. 268 While the issue of appropriate executive
compensation is beyond the scope of this Article, these
individuals are clearly significantly rewarded for their work
and it is difficult to see how such significant compensation is
distinguishable from a profit.
Through these mechanisms, the HSC transplantation
industry involves a hidden economy where for-profit entities

264. See Appel Blue, supra note 223, at 77 (noting that the tissue industry
expanded to a $1 billion industry in 2003); Buck, supra note 226, at 122–25
(noting that the tissue industry is able to achieve high profits due to the fact
that, unlike solid organs, tissues do not need to be transplanted immediately
and can be heavily processed—by for-profit processors—and stored for long
periods before transplantation); Katz, supra note 226; About Lifeforce,
LIFEFORCE CRYOBANKS, https://www.lifeforcecryobanks.com/about-lifeforce
.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (describing Lifeforce’s use of the proprietary
PremierMaxCB processing system); Public Cord Blood Bank, supra note 257
(“CORD:USE utilizes the BioArchive cryogenic freezer [for storage and] . . .
the SEPAX processing system to help maximize the number of stem cells
processed and retained from each banked cord blood unit.”); Stem Cell
Optimization Process, STEMCYTE, http://web.archive.org/web/2014071000
0238/http://www.stemcyte.com/why-choose-stemcyte/stem-cell-optimization-pr
ocess (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (describing StemCyte’s use of a proprietary
stem cell optimization process).
265. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
266. See NAT’L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM & SUBSIDIARY, supra note 120,
at 5; National Marrow Donor Program and Be the Match Key Messages, Facts
and Figures, BE THE MATCH (Jan. 2013), http://bethematch.org/News/Facts-an
d-Figures—PDF-/ (“[T]he NMDP employs nearly 860 staff . . . .”).
267. NAT’L MARROW DONOR PROGRAM & SUBSIDIARY, supra note 120, at 5.
268. National Marrow Donor Program, supra note 247.
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operate in the shadows of nonprofit organizations, and profit
from altruistic donations. The mandated altruism of donors is
inequitable with the profits being made by others in the
industry. Additionally, although an employee’s salary is not a
profit per se, it is a benefit that individuals receive within the
HSC industry. Even if employee salaries and executive
compensation merely reflect reimbursement for the individuals’
work, it must be considered whether it is reasonable and
ethical to permit employees to be reimbursed for their time
while not granting the same level of reimbursement to donors.
Furthermore, while donors are permitted to be reimbursed for
lost wages and travel as a result of their donation, this is
limited and does not permit reimbursement for time spent or
pain and suffering incurred.269
C. THE CURRENT RELIANCE ON ALTRUISM AND LIMITED
REIMBURSEMENT FAILS TO RESPECT THE INHERENT VALUE OF
THE DONORS’ TIME AS WELL AS NONTRADITIONAL WORK
As HSC donors are prohibited from receiving
compensation, donors are often described as being altruistic.270
Nevertheless, these donors are not without any rewards since
many individuals who have donated indicate that they gain
great personal satisfaction from knowing that they are able to
help others. 271 However, some individuals will be unable to
share the personal satisfaction that comes with HSC donation,
and consequently, recipients will be unable to benefit from
269. HSCs collected from peripheral blood involve donors taking drugs for
five days, as well as one to two days of aspiration lasting a total of eight to ten
hours to collect the HSCs and adverse symptoms for five to six days. See supra
notes 47–50, 73 and accompanying text. HSCs collected from bone marrow
involve daylong surgery under anesthesia and adverse symptoms for the
following week or several weeks. See supra notes 44–45, 73 and accompanying
text; see also infra Part III.C (discussing the shortcomings of the current
reliance on altruism and limited reimbursement).
270. NOTA only currently prohibits the receipt of compensation for HSCs
in bone marrow, but administration of HSC donations results in all HSC
donors being unable to receive compensation. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
271. Related donors likely have many motivations for donating besides or
in addition to altruism including: love, beneficence, loyalty, guilt, and need.
See Mark J. Cherry, Why Should We Compensate Organ Donors When We Can
Continue to Take Organs for Free? A Response to Some of My Critics, 34 J.
MED. & PHIL. 649, 656 (2009).
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their HSCs where potential donors are financially unable to
give the extensive amount of time required for HSC donation.
The exception in NOTA permitting donors to receive
reimbursement for lost wages and travel is limited and will
likely not sufficiently compensate individuals who are selfemployed or who do not earn traditional wages.272 Additionally,
the NOTA exception does not recognize the value of
traditionally uncompensated services such as individuals who
care for family members or who do work around their own
homes. The prohibition in NOTA thus prevents individuals who
are self-employed or engage in nontraditional work from
obtaining the same benefits that others may though HSC
donation. By limiting HSC donations only to those who are
seen to be donating altruistically, the government fails to
recognize the reality that some individuals do not have the
luxury of being able to donate without being compensated.
D. STRICTLY REGULATED DONOR COMPENSATION WILL NOT
EXPOSE DONORS OR RECIPIENTS TO UNDUE RISK
1. Compensation Will Not Subject Donors to Undue Coercion
HSC donors are subjected to risks associated with their
donations, including a risk of physical harm and a risk of
intrusion of privacy. 273 Although compensation will not alter
the incidence of these risks, concern has been expressed in the
context of solid organ donation as to whether compensated
donors would be more likely to disregard the risks. 274 While
preventing the coercion of the poor is a laudable goal, the need
for government intrusion to prevent such coercion must be
considered relative to the risk faced by the individual.
Society currently permits individuals to engage in
activities wherein they face a large risk of physical harm,
including clinical trials and high-risk occupations in exchange
for compensation. Additionally, individuals are permitted, in
many jurisdictions in the United States, to be compensated for
the donation of oocytes, which requires anesthesia, and may
272. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2012).
273. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
274. See Arthur J. Matas et al., In Defense of a Regulated System of
Compensation for Living Donations, 13 CURRENT OPINION ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 379, 382 (2008).
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also be compensated for gestational surrogacy.275 Furthermore,
although the successful transplant of HSCs results in the
recipient’s blood being comprised of cells with the donor’s
genetic information and may result in the invasion of the
donor’s privacy interests, the donor is able to consent to such
risks through informed consent.276
The donation of HSCs, therefore, does not subject donors to
greater risks than other activities that individuals are
permitted to receive compensation for subjecting themselves to.
Furthermore, setting a ceiling on the amount of compensation
can mitigate the potential for economic coercion of donors.
Regardless, the very existence of any risk to the donor supports
limited compensation in exchange for this risk.
In any event, Congress did not intend the ban in NOTA to
include replenishable items, such as blood, whose donation
does not compromise the ongoing health of the donor.277 There
have been longstanding arguments made that bone marrow
was included in the ban by mistake on the basis that bone
marrow is regenerated by the body. 278 Nevertheless, the
proposal to include all HSCs within the prohibition in NOTA is
squarely contrary to Congress’ intent that donations of blood
and other body parts that do not affect the donors’ health would
not be included in the ban. First, the proposed rule would cover
all HSCs “without regard to the method of their collection,”279
275. See Williams et al., supra note 76, at 36.
276. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Peter Aldhous,
Bone Marrow Donors Risk DNA Identity Mix-Up, 188 NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 29,
2005, at 11 (discussing the initial misidentification of a suspect for sexual
assault, when a semen sample matched the DNA of a bone marrow recipient
in jail at the time of the assault, whose DNA had been obtained from a blood
sample, and the bone marrow donor was the actual assailant); see also
Forensik: Leiche Trug Mannliche und Weibliche DNA [Forensics: Corpse
Containing Male and Female DNA], SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2008) (Ger.),
http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/forensik-leiche-trug-maennliche-u
nd-weibliche-dna-a-585032.html (discussing how medical researchers
discovered a corpse with both male and female DNA markers, and realized he
was the recipient of a bone marrow transplant).
277. See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16
(1984); see supra notes 145, 153 and accompanying text.
278. See Jeff Rowes, Saving Lives: IJ Challenges the Federal Ban on
Compensating Bone Marrow Donors, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Dec. 2009),
http://www.ij.org/saving-lives-ij-challenges-the-federal-ban-on-compensating
-bone-marrow-donors.
279. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ,” supra note 7.
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so the prohibition would apply to donations of blood, which
Congress expressly did not intend.280 Second, the donation of
cord blood carries minimal risk to the donor’s health, and any
prohibition could not be justified on the basis of such a
negligible risk.281
2. Compensation Will Not Subject Recipients to Undue Harm
The regulated compensation of HSC donors will not subject
HSC recipients to undue harm as any potential economic
exploitation of recipients is preventable, and permitting
compensation will not expose recipients to an increased risk of
contracting an infectious agent compared to existing blood
donations.
i. Any Potential Economic Exploitation of Recipients Is
Preventable
In the proposed rule to expand the prohibition in NOTA to
cover all HSCs, the HRSA expressed concern that due to
stringent matching requirements for HSCs, there was an
increased potential for HSC donors to extort high sums of
money from recipients. 282 However, the allowance of
compensation will not necessarily result in a free market for
HSCs. Regulations should be put in place to set ceilings for
such compensation, to permit compensation only through arm’s
length transactions, or to specify what type of compensation is
permissible. Confidentiality policies currently prevent
unrelated donors and recipients from having non-anonymous
contact before transplants and during the first year
afterwards, 283 so these policies would prevent direct
transactions. Further regulations could prohibit all
compensation other than that directly paid from a
matchmaking organization (such as Be the Match). Regulation
of the type of compensation may also serve to protect against
donor coercion or extortion. Compensation could be limited to
280. Under normal conditions, HSCs are present at low levels in the
peripheral blood supply. See Armitage, supra note 16, at 9.
281. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
282. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ,” supra note 7.
283. See Do Patients and Donors Meet?, BE THE MATCH, http://bethematch
.org/Transplant-Basics/Do-patients-and-donors-meet/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2014).
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nonmonetary forms that cannot readily be exchanged for cash
similar to the FDA regulations for “volunteer” blood
donations.284
In any event, there is a far greater potential for recipients
to be extorted in situations of related donors than with
unrelated donors where contact is controlled and regulation is
more easily achieved.285 Related transplants account for more
than forty percent of all HSC transplants in the United States
and the prohibition in NOTA is likely insufficient to prevent
compensation in these situations, as they are likely opaque
transactions and unlikely to affect interstate commerce. 286
Although states have jurisdiction to legislate and regulate such
transactions, the fact that very few states prohibit the sale of
HSCs suggests a lack of issues in this area.287

284. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
285. See Confer et al., supra note 44, at 547 (describing a compatible sister
who refused to donate, but changed her mind after media attention); cf. Rakhi
Ruparelia, Giving Away the “Gift of Life”: Surrogacy and the Canadian
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 23 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 11 (2007) (discussing
how the potential for exploitation in noncommercial surrogacy—utilizing
family members as surrogates—may be greater than in commercial surrogacy
due to the inability of individuals to make decisions freely within their family).
Other proposals have been made to incentivize organ donation using
nonmonetary incentives. See About Us, MORE MARROW DONORS,
http://moremarrowdonors.org/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (proposing
incentivizing donors with rare marrow types through small scholarships,
housing allowances, or gifts to charity); see also Jake Linford, The Kidney
Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can Provide Financial
Incentives for Kidney Donation While Preserving Altruistic Meaning, 2 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265, 267 (2009) (proposing using methods such
as scholarships to incentivize kidney donation from living donors).
286. General Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 42 (stating that in
2011, HRSA recorded 3114 related HSC transplants and 4421 unrelated
transplants). Due to how HLA matching works and the fact that patients have
a 25% probability of matching each of their siblings, but a very low probability
of matching anyone else in the general population, it is unlikely that related
matches impact interstate commerce. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012); Childhood
CANCER
INST.,
Hematopoietic
Cell
Transplantation,
NAT’L
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/treatment/childHCT/HealthProfession
al/page3 (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
287. Less than 2% of states prohibit receiving compensation for HSCs
collected from cord blood and peripheral blood and only 25% of states prohibit
compensation for HSCs from bone marrow. See infra Table 1.
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ii. Permitting Compensation Will Not Expose Recipients to an
Increased Risk of Contracting an Infectious Agent Compared to
Blood Donations
It was once argued that the practice of paying for blood in
the United States resulted in increased hepatitis transmission
compared to countries relying solely on altruistic donations;
however, the basis for this argument has been questioned by
academics and studies. 288 In any event, there is no evidence
that the risk would be greater for HSC recipients than for blood
recipients, which has become a broadly accepted risk with more
than thirty million blood transfusions happening every year.289
Additionally, a level of risk is already considered permissible in
HSC transplant given the important need for such transplants
as evidenced by the exceptions to testing requirements that do
not exist for blood donations.290
The receipt of valuable consideration in exchange for blood
donations is not prohibited by NOTA, and the only laws on this
topic are FDA regulations requiring that blood for transfusion
be labeled either as from a paid or voluntary donor. 291
Furthermore, blood may be labeled as from a voluntary donor
when the donor receives valuable consideration, such as gift
certificates, in exchange for the donation. 292 HSC donors are
subject to extensive screening requirements in order to be

288. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP 205–07 (Ann Oakley &
John Ashton eds., New Press 1997) (arguing that the blood donation system in
the United States, which in the 1960s relied heavily on commercial donation,
was more likely to have quality issues, including hepatitis contamination,
than blood donation systems relying on altruism). Subsequently, many
academics argued that Titmuss was wrong to suggest that contamination was
a result of payment. See Kenneth Arrow, Gifts and Exchange, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 343, 361–62 (1972); Healey, supra note 215, at 532–35 (1999); see also
Nicola Lacetera et al., Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood Donations, 340
SCIENCE 927, 928 (2013) (explaining that five studies from the United States
and Switzerland investigated use of rewards and no effect on blood safety was
detected where fifteen different types of rewards were given—where safety
data were available).
289. See
Blood
Facts
and
Statistics,
AM.
RED
CROSS,
http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-about-blood/blood-facts-and-statistics (last
visited Oct. 4, 2014).
290. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
292. CPG sec. 230.150 Blood Donor Classification Statement, Paid or
Volunteer Donor, supra note 171.
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eligible to donate HSCs.293 Moreover, the time commitment and
process involved in donating HSCs is more intensive than that
of donating blood.294 This increase in time may result in the
donor feeling more accountable to the recipient. Given the
absence of evidence demonstrating an increased safety risk
stemming from HSCs as compared to whole blood donations,295
subjecting HSCs to stronger compensation regulations than
whole blood is not justified.
E. THE CURRENT PROHIBITION IN NOTA CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
ON THE BASIS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL NORMS
The international response to a change in the United
States’ laws on compensation for HSCs will likely depend on
the type and amount of compensation that is permitted, and
whether the compensation can be categorized as
reimbursement. Although there is the potential for a change in
American policy to have detrimental effects on the
international exchange of HSCs, such effects are unlikely.
Three possible reactions to the allowance of compensation
include: (1) initiation of changes to international standards to
permit compensation; (2) some countries may refuse to accept
HSCs from paid donors; and (3) the U.S. registry facilitating
paid HSC donations may be removed from BMDW.
Recipients around the world rely on international donors of
HSCs. 296 The ability to obtain HSCs from outside of the
patient’s home country have been facilitated by the
collaboration of international registries (through BMDW),
which has increased the pool of available donors resulting in
293. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS
OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS
(HCT/PS)
11
(2007),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidanc
es/CellularandGeneTherapy/ucm078703.pdf.
294. Compare Two Paths to Bone Marrow Transplant: Patients and
Donors, BE THE MATCH, http://bethematch.org/transplant-basics/timeline-of-atransplant/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (describing the process of bone marrow
transplants),
with
Donation
FAQs,
AM.
RED
CROSS,
http://www.redcrossblood.org/donating-blood/donation-faqs (last visited Oct.
14, 2014) (describing the process of blood donation).
295. Joerg Halter et al., Severe Events in Donors After Allogeneic
Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donation, 94 HEMATOLOGICA 94, 94 (2009).
296. See supra notes 115, 234–35 and accompanying text.
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increased probabilities of finding a matching donor.297 Donors
in international registries agree to make HSCs available to any
recipient worldwide, and are unaware at donation of the
identity or location of the recipient.298
No one set of standards is applicable to all HSC registries;
however, many accreditation programs advocate for the unpaid
donation of HSCs, and include standards prohibiting the
payment of donors. 299 This applies predominantly to the
donation of HSCs in bone marrow or peripheral blood. 300
Additionally, compensation that does not amount to payment is
accepted by many organizations, with the definition of
compensation varying from specified expenses (likely similar to
that currently permitted in the United States) to broad
compensation that reflects the inconveniences of the
donation.301
The first potential response to the United States
permitting compensation for HSCs would be to initiate similar
changes in standards and norms across the globe. Such
changes would reflect the recognition that HSCs are currently
being purchased and sold on an international market. Allowing
compensation to reflect inconveniences such as pain and lost
time would merely expand upon existing reimbursement for
donor expenses for wages and travel. Countries might further
choose to allow HSCs from international donors who have been
compensated, while still prohibiting their own citizens from
being compensated. 302
Another potential response is for countries to refuse to
accept HSCs from paid donors. Such a response is unlikely, as
many countries at present or in the past prohibited paid
donations within their borders, while permitting the purchase
of blood products originating from paid donors in the United
297. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
302. Cf. Kelly Crowe, Paying for Blood Plasma Raises New Questions, CBC
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/paying-for-blood-plasma-raisesnew-questions-1.1361316 (demonstrating that although most jurisdictions in
Canada prohibit plasma donors from being compensated, Canada relies on
intravenous immunoglobulin plasma products purchased from the United
States where many of the donors have been paid).
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States. 303 It is possible that a donor’s compensation status
could be considered merely a part of donor screening, either as
something to be considered in the original HLA matching
algorithm or during the testing process.304 When a search of
BMDW reveals a match, potential donors could be asked
whether they wish to be compensated for their donation, and
countries not permitting paid donors would be free to reject
such donors.
Third, the BMDW might respond to paid donors in the
United States by prohibiting registries with paid donors from
having access to BMDW. This reaction could potentially have
the greatest negative impact on bone marrow donations
internationally and in the United States. However, this could
be mitigated by the creation of two separate registries in the
United States—one for volunteer donors and one for paid
donors. All international searches could occur through the
unpaid registry, and the parallel paid registry would operate
separately from the international system. While such a system
would continue American patients’ access to international
HSCs, it would firewall international patients from paid donors
in the United States. As the Be the Match Registry contains
nearly half of the world’s donors, the international impact could
be significant.305 If countries outside of the United States were
to reject compensated HSC donors on principle, in the end they
would be adversely impacting their own citizens by reducing
the odds of a match. This might be defensible were it not for
the existing market. Thus, the possibility of other countries
adopting an ethically dubious restriction of their citizens’

303. See id.
304. Be the Match currently permits donors on the registry who would
likely be prohibited from donating HSCs within the United States, but who
could potentially donate elsewhere. For example, FDA regulations exclude
HSC donors who have spent more than three months in the United Kingdom
from 1980 to 1996; however, Be the Match does not restrict the registry with
respect to travel but indicates that travel will be evaluated if a match is found.
THE
MATCH,
See
Medical
Guidelines—Who
Can
Join?,
BE
http://bethematch.org/Support-the-Cause/Donate-bone-marrow/Join-the-marr
ow-registry/Medical-guidelines/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015); see also U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 293, at
18–19 (outlining travel and significant time spent in foreign countries as
relevant information for screening potential donors).
305. See BONE MARROW DONORS WORLDWIDE, supra note 101, at 9.
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freedom should not prevent the United States from enacting a
policy that is appropriate for its own citizens.
IV. CONCLUSION
HSC transplantation has the potential to save lives, but
currently, many patients die waiting for transplants due to a
lack of matching donors.306 Compensating HSC donors makes
rational, legal, and ethical sense. Such compensation will not
only increase the number of registered donors, but also
motivate existing registered donors to donate. Compensation
will also further recognize the important contribution of donors
to the HSC transplantation industry and begin to bring to light
the shadow profits currently earned by non-donors.
HRSA should reject the proposed rule to expand the
prohibition in NOTA to include all HSCs regardless of source,
and moreover, Congress should repeal the application of the
prohibition to bone marrow. Congress should legislate and fund
a program that permits donor compensation and studies the
resulting improvement in HSC availability. In order to fully
remedy current bureaucratic obstacles to donor compensation,
Congress will also have to instruct the NMDP to work with
compensated donors. To prevent potential misuse, the
legislation should set a ceiling on the amounts donors may
receive, and if politically necessary, potentially only permit
compensation to offset actual expenses and inconveniences, but
not allow for profits. There is no need for a compensation floor,
as altruistic donors will still be welcomed. Such a framework
would go a long way towards providing a match for the
thousands of Americans who are unable to find matches each
year.307

306. See Carollo, supra note 4; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text
(explaining the high rate of cases in which individuals need unrelated donors
to donate healthy bone marrow).
307. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Table 1: Compilation of State Laws
Is Compensation Prohibited
for HSCs from:

State

State Statutes That
Only Prohibit Sale
of Cadaver Body
Parts

Relevant Body Parts to
Which Prohibition
Applies (In Living
Donors)

Bone
Marrow?

Peripheral
Blood?

Cord
Blood?

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 22-19175 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013)

—

No

No

No

Alaska

ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.52.233 (2012)

—

No

No

No

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-854
(2009)

—

No

No

No

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-17-1216 (2014)

—

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

—

No

No

No

Delaware

Tissues, blood, other
fluids
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2710(10), 2713(f)
(2003)

Yes

Yes

Yes

District of
Columbia

Tissue, not blood
D.C. CODE § 7-1501.01
(LexisNexis 2012)

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Nonrenewable or
nonregenerative tissue
CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 367f (West 2010)
Tissue, not blood
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1234-102(18), 12-34-116
(2013)

California

Colorado

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-289o
(West 2011)

Eye, cornea, kidney,
liver, heart, lung,
pancreas, bone, and
skin
FLA. STAT. ANN. §
873.01(3) (West 2013)
Any part except: whole
blood, blood plasma,
blood products, blood
derivatives, or other
self-replicating bodily
fluids
GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-12-160 (2011)

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327-16 (West
Supp. 2013)

—

No

No

No

Idaho

IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 39-3417 (2007)

—

No

No

No
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Any part except: blood,
blood products or
derivatives, or other
body fluids
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/12-20 (West
Supp. 2013)
Bone marrow
IND. CODE ANN. § 3546-5-1 (LexisNexis
2009)

Illinois

Indiana
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Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Iowa

IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 142C.10 (West
2014)

—

No

No

No

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-3235 (Supp.
2013)

—

No

No

No

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.1939
(LexisNexis 2011)

—

No

No

No

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT.
ANN.
§ 17:2354.4 (2013)

—

No

No

No

—

No

No

No

Maine

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS
§ 4-513 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013)

—

No

No

No

Massachusetts

MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 113A, § 16
(LexisNexis 2014)

—

No

No

No

Bone marrow; not:
whole blood, blood
products, blood
derivatives, or other
self-replicating bodily
fluids
MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.10204(1), (5)
(West 2012)

Yes

No

No

Michigan

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525A.16 (West
2012)

—

No

No

No

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-39-131 (2013)

—

No

No

No

Missouri

MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 194.275 (West
2011)

—

No

No

No

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-17-302 (2013)

—

No

No

No

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-4839 (Supp.
2012)

—

No

No

No
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Nevada

NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 451.590
(LexisNexis 2009)

—

No

No

No

New
Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 291-A:16
(LexisNexis 2014)

—

No

No

No

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:22-2 (West
Supp. 2014)

—

No

No

No

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-6B-16 (West
2011)

—

No

No

No

Bone marrow, not blood
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 4307(1) (McKinney
2009)

Yes

No

No

New York

North
Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-412.18
(2013)

—

No

No

No

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.6-15 (2012)

—

No

No

No

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.18
(LexisNexis 2011)

—

No

No

No

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 2200.16A
(West Supp. 2013)

—

No

No

No

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 97.981
(West 2010)

—

No

No

No

Nonregenerative tissue;
excludes human blood
and blood products, in
vitro preparation of
cells, and other tissues
readily renewable by
the body
35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 10025 (West
2012)

No

No

No

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-18.6.1-16
(Supp. 2013)

—

No

No

No

South
Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-43-375 (2013)

—

No

No

No

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS
§ 34-26-63 (2011)

—

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Tennessee

Tissue, not blood
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6830-102(17), 68-30-401
(2013)
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Tissue; not: blood, blood
components, blood
derivatives, or blood
reagents
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 48.02(a) (West 2011)

Texas

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-28-116
(LexisNexis 2013)

—

No

No

No

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit
18, § 5250p (2010)

—

No

No

No

Any parts except: blood,
and other selfreplicating bodily fluids
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1291.16 (West 2011)

Yes

No

No

—

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Virginia

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 68.64.150
(West Supp. 2013)

Tissue, not blood
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
16-19-3(21), 16-19-16
(LexisNexis 2011)
Bone marrow; not:
whole blood, blood
plasma, blood products,
or blood derivatives
WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.345 (West 2006)

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-5-215 (2013)

—

